# 1NC

### 1

#### Interpretation – “economic engagement” is an iterated process across multiple areas to influence state behavior – only trade and aid are topical

Resnick 1 – Dr. Evan Resnick, Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yeshiva University, “Defining Engagement”, Journal of International Affairs, Spring, 54(2), Ebsco

A REFINED DEFINITION OF ENGAGEMENT In order to establish a more effective framework for dealing with unsavory regimes, I propose that we define engagement as the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state through the comprehensive establishment and enhancement of contacts with that state across multiple issue-areas (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, cultural). The following is a brief list of the specific forms that such contacts might include: DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS Extension of diplomatic recognition; normalization of diplomatic relations Promotion of target-state membership in international institutions and regimes Summit meetings and other visits by the head of state and other senior government officials of sender state to target state and vice-versa MILITARY CONTACTS Visits of senior military officials of the sender state to the target state and vice-versa Arms transfers Military aid and cooperation Military exchange and training programs Confidence and security-building measures Intelligence sharing ECONOMIC CONTACTS Trade agreements and promotion Foreign economic and humanitarian aid in the form of loans and/or grants CULTURAL CONTACTS Cultural treaties Inauguration of travel and tourism links Sport, artistic and academic exchanges (n25) Engagement is an iterated process in which the sender and target state develop a relationship of increasing interdependence, culminating in the endpoint of "normalized relations" characterized by a high level of interactions across multiple domains. Engagement is a quintessential exchange relationship: the target state wants the prestige and material resources that would accrue to it from increased contacts with the sender state, while the sender state seeks to modify the domestic and/or foreign policy behavior of the target state. This deductive logic could adopt a number of different forms or strategies when deployed in practice.(n26) For instance, individual contacts can be established by the sender state at either a low or a high level of conditionality.(n27) Additionally, the sender state can achieve its objectives using engagement through any one of the following causal processes: by directly modifying the behavior of the target regime; by manipulating or reinforcing the target states' domestic balance of political power between competing factions that advocate divergent policies; or by shifting preferences at the grassroots level in the hope that this will precipitate political change from below within the target state. This definition implies that three necessary conditions must hold for engagement to constitute an effective foreign policy instrument. First, the overall magnitude of contacts between the sender and target states must initially be low. If two states are already bound by dense contacts in multiple domains (i.e., are already in a highly interdependent relationship), engagement loses its impact as an effective policy tool. Hence, one could not reasonably invoke the possibility of the US engaging Canada or Japan in order to effect a change in either country's political behavior. Second, the material or prestige needs of the target state must be significant, as engagement derives its power from the promise that it can fulfill those needs. The greater the needs of the target state, the more amenable to engagement it is likely to be. For example, North Korea's receptivity to engagement by the US dramatically increased in the wake of the demise of its chief patron, the Soviet Union, and the near-total collapse of its national economy.(n28) Third, the target state must perceive the engager and the international order it represents as a potential source of the material or prestige resources it desires. This means that autarkic, revolutionary and unlimited regimes which eschew the norms and institutions of the prevailing order, such as Stalin's Soviet Union or Hitler's Germany, will not be seduced by the potential benefits of engagement. This reformulated conceptualization avoids the pitfalls of prevailing scholarly conceptions of engagement. It considers the policy as a set of means rather than ends, does not delimit the types of states that can either engage or be engaged, explicitly encompasses contacts in multiple issue-areas, allows for the existence of multiple objectives in any given instance of engagement and, as will be shown below, permits the elucidation of multiple types of positive sanctions.

#### Violation – []

#### That’s a voting issue –

#### a) Predictable limits – they explode the topic which overstretches the research burden and incentivizes a shift to generics – hurts critical thinking and produces stale strategizing, hurting research skills. That prevents rigorous testing of the aff which hurts advocacy construction.

#### b) Ground – they bypass topic offense based on commodity trading, diplomatic agreements, and investment DAs like SOI. Non-trade affs steal international CP ground which is key to testing federal action on an international topic.

#### Default to competing interpretations – most objective.

### 2

#### Mexico is a *grave* and *persistent* human rights violator, D-rule to shun

Beversluis 89 — Eric H. Beversluis, Professor of Philosophy and Economics at Aquinas College, holds an A.B. in Philosophy and German from Calvin College, an M.A. in Philosophy from Northwestern University, an M.A. in Economics from Ohio State University, and a Ph.D. in the Philosophy of Education from Northwestern University, 1989 (“On Shunning Undesirable Regimes: Ethics and Economic Sanctions,” *Public Affairs Quarterly*, Volume 3, Number 2, April, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via JSTOR, p. 17-19)

A fundamental task of morality is resolving conflicting interests. If we both want the same piece of land, ethics provides a basis for resolving the conflict by identifying "mine" and "thine." If in anger I want to smash your [end page 17] face, ethics indicates that your face's being unsmashed is a legitimate interest of yours which takes precedence over my own interest in expressing my rage. Thus ethics identifies the rights of individuals when their interests conflict. But how can a case for shunning be made on this view of morality? Whose interests (rights) does shunning protect? The shunner may well have to sacrifice his interest, e.g., by foregoing a beneficial trade relationship, but whose rights are thereby protected? In shunning there seem to be no "rights" that are protected. For shunning, as we have seen, does not assume that the resulting cost will change the disapproved behavior. If economic sanctions against South Africa will not bring apartheid to an end, and thus will not help the blacks get their rights, on what grounds might it be a duty to impose such sanctions? We find the answer when we note that there is another "level" of moral duties. When Galtung speaks of "reinforcing … morality," he has identified a duty that goes beyond specific acts of respecting people's rights. The argument goes like this: There is more involved in respecting the rights of others than not violating them by one's actions. For if there is such a thing as a moral order, which unites people in a moral community, then surely one has a duty (at least prima facie) not only to avoid violating the rights of others with one's actions but also to support that moral order. Consider that the moral order itself contributes significantly to people's rights being respected. It does so by encouraging and reinforcing moral behavior and by discouraging and sanctioning immoral behavior. In this moral community people mutually reinforce each other's moral behavior and thus raise the overall level of morality. Were this moral order to disintegrate, were people to stop reinforcing each other's moral behavior, there would be much more violation of people's rights. Thus to the extent that behavior affects the moral order, it indirectly affects people's rights. And this is where shunning fits in. Certain types of behavior constitute a direct attack on the moral order. When the violation of human rights is flagrant, willful, and persistent, the offender is, as it were, thumbing her nose at the moral order, publicly rejecting it as binding her behavior. Clearly such behavior, if tolerated by society, will weaken and perhaps eventually undermine altogether the moral order. Let us look briefly at those three conditions which turn immoral behavior into an attack on the moral order. An immoral action is flagrant if it is "extremely or deliberately conspicuous; notorious, shocking." Etymologically the word means "burning" or "blazing." The definition of shunning implies therefore that those offenses require shunning which are shameless or indiscreet, which the person makes no effort to hide and no good-faith effort to excuse. Such actions "blaze forth" as an attack on the moral order. But to merit shunning the action must also be willful and persistent. We do not consider the actions of the "backslider," the [end page 18] weak-willed, the one-time offender to be challenges to the moral order. It is the repeat offender, the unrepentant sinner, the cold-blooded violator of morality whose behavior demands that others publicly reaffirm the moral order. When someone flagrantly, willfully, and repeatedly violates the moral order, those who believe in the moral order, the members of the moral community, must respond in a way that reaffirms the legitimacy of that moral order. How does shunning do this? First, by refusing publicly to have to do with such a person one announces support for the moral order and backs up the announcement with action. This action reinforces the commitment to the moral order both of the shunner and of the other members of the community. (Secretary of State Shultz in effect made this argument in his call for international sanctions on Libya in the early days of 1986.) Further, shunning may have a moral effect on the shunned person, even if the direct impact is not adequate to change the immoral behavior. If the shunned person thinks of herself as part of the moral community, shunning may well make clear to her that she is, in fact, removing herself from that community by the behavior in question. Thus shunning may achieve by moral suasion what cannot be achieved by "force." Finally, shunning may be a form of punishment, of moral sanction, whose appropriateness depends not on whether it will change the person's behavior, but on whether he deserves the punishment for violating the moral order. Punishment then can be viewed as a way of maintaining the moral order, of "purifying the community" after it has been made "unclean," as ancient communities might have put it. Yet not every immoral action requires that we shun. As noted above, we live in a fallen world. None of us is perfect. If the argument implied that we may have nothing to do with anyone who is immoral, it would consist of a reductio of the very notion of shunning. To isolate a person, to shun him, to give him the "silent treatment," is a serious thing. Nothing strikes at a person's wellbeing as person more directly than such ostracism. Furthermore, not every immoral act is an attack on the moral order. Actions which are repented and actions which are done out of weakness of will clearly violate but do not attack the moral order. Thus because of the serious nature of shunning, it is defined as a response not just to any violation of the moral order, but to attacks on the moral order itself through flagrant, willful, and persistent wrongdoing. We can also now see why failure to shun can under certain circumstances suggest complicity. But it is not that we have a duty to shun because failure to do so suggests complicity. Rather, because we have an obligation to shun in certain circumstances, when we fail to do so others may interpret our failure as tacit complicity in the willful, persistent, and flagrant immorality.

### 3

#### Chinese engagement with Latin America is trending upwards – it’s key to CCP export markets and energy imports

Myers and Hongbo 13 (Margaret Myers, director of the China and Latin America program at the Inter-American Dialogue, Sun Hongbo, associate professor at the Institute of Latin American Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing, each answering a question from the Inter-American Dialogue “How 'Strategically Important' Is Latin America for China?” http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3210)

A: Margaret Myers, director of the China and Latin America program at the Inter-American Dialogue: "Latin America became a strategically important market for Chinese exporters a few years ago following decreases in demand for Chinese goods from Europe and the United States. Chinese exports to Europe fell 9 percent in 2011 in comparison with export levels in 2010, for example, and exports to the United States fell 5 percent. As U.S. and European demand continues to lag, Latin American nations should expect sustained interest in their markets and new market- and efficiency-seeking investments. As China continues its process of industrial upgrading, Latin America will also see more in the way of high-tech goods, as well as marketing of distinctly Chinese brands. Chinese cars are already being sold in several Latin American countries, including Brazil, Peru, Venezuela and Colombia. And Chinese cell phones and computers are increasingly popular among Latin American consumers. As the former LAC director general at China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Yang is uniquely familiar with both the promises and pitfalls of trade with Latin America. While Latin America remains an appealing market for exports, Chinese producers and officials are painfully aware of growing protectionism in response to China's market-seeking endeavors. The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences cited nationalization and trade protectionism trends among the top 20 notable events in the region in 2012. China expects to avoid protectionist measures by building mutually beneficial, 'win-win' trade relations. Chinese government and commercial entities in Latin America will indeed be working to build stronger trade relations in the coming years." A: Sun Hongbo, associate professor at the Institute of Latin American Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing: "China regards Latin America as a promising strategic trade partner not only for diversifying export destinations, but also for safeguarding commodity import security. According to official statistics, Chinese exports to Latin America represented 6.74 percent of its total exports for the first nine months of 2012. Compared to the United States, European Union and Asia, Latin America has absorbed a marginal share of China's fast export expansion. From 2003 to 2011, the region's share of China's export volume only rose from 2.71 percent to 6.41 percent. Chinese policymakers expect to build a more sustainable and balanced trade relationship with Latin America. This issue has been widely negotiated both in political and commercial circles from the two sides. However, the bilateral effort still needs to find an efficient way to achieve satisfactory results, particularly for those countries that have a trade deficit with China. China continues to increase its imports from Latin America-with the region supplying 3.62 percent of China's total imports in 2003 to 7.13 percent in 2012. China's slowdown in 2012 caused serious concern in commodity-exporting countries in South America. Nonetheless, Chinese trade with Latin America in 2012 is estimated at more than $250 billion, higher than the year prior. Chinese business groups will attach great importance to the market volume in Latin America, but the export opportunities will also depend on strong economic growth in this region. In 2013, China's highlighted macroeconomic policy device for sustaining stable growth is to accelerate the pace of high-quality urbanization, which will necessitate increasing imports of mineral, agricultural and energy products from Latin America."

#### Bolstering US influence pushes China out – Columbia proves it determines contracts

Ellis 12

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At the political level, US engagement with Latin American ¶ countries has impacted the ability of the PRC to develop ¶ military and other ties in the region. Although journalistic ¶ and academic accounts often suggest that the 19th century ¶ Monroe Doctrine continues to be pursued by contemporary ¶ US policymakers, with a presumed desire to “keep China out” ¶ of the region,26 official US policy has repeatedly met Chinese ¶ initiatives in the hemisphere with a cautiously welcoming tone.27 Nonetheless, Latin America’s own leadership has ¶ responded to Chinese initiatives with a view of how engagement with China could damage its relationship with the United ¶ States. Colombia’s close relationship with the United States, for ¶ example, made the military leadership of the country reluctant ¶ to procure major military items from the PRC.28¶ The same logic has also applied to countries such as ¶ Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia, for whom embracing the ¶ PRC politically and economically signaled displeasure with ¶ the United States. The degree to which a “bad” relationship ¶ with the United States has propelled a “positive” relationship with China has increasingly gone beyond symbolism. The desire of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez to ¶ diversify away from Venezuelan dependence on the United ¶ States as the nation’s primary oil export market, for example, opened the door for massive loan-backed Chinese ¶ construction projects, the purchase of Chinese commercial goods and greatly expanded participation by Chinese ¶ oil companies.29 US refusal to sell F-16 fighter aircraft and ¶ components to Venezuela in 2006 prompted Venezuela to ¶ engage with China, and other countries, to procure military ¶ hardware. Similarly, Bolivia purchased Chinese K-8s after ¶ the United States blocked it from acquiring a comparable ¶ aircraft from the Czech Republic.30

#### China’s exports are key to a sustainable economy – recent shocks mean it’s on the brink

Holland 7/9 (Tom, writer of the South China Morning Post’s Monitor column, internally citing statistics from ADBI, the Asian Development Bank Institute, Dr. Yuqing Xing, professor of economics an director of Asian economic policy at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, PhD in economics from the University of Illinois—Urbana-Champaign, MA and BA from Peking University, South China Morning Post Monitor, July 9, 2013, “Despite rebalancing, exports still vitally important to China,” <http://www.scmp.com/business/article/1278239/despite-rebalancing-exports-still-vitally-important-china>, alp)

Unfortunately, the figure for gross exports isn't much use either. In an economy where all the value of all exports was produced domestically, then gross exports would give a good idea of external demand. But real supply chains don't work like that. Chinese factories import flash memory chips from Japan, displays from Korea and processors from the United States, which they then assemble into smartphones for sale around the world. So although the face value of China's exports may be high, the value added by China's factories is often relatively low. But although gross exports aren't much help in gauging the true importance of external demand, net exports don't work either. If all China's imports were components destined for re-export, the net figure would do the trick. But they aren't. Imports are also consumed domestically, not least by Chinese buying their own smartphones. To estimate the real contribution of external demand, we would have to account for the proportion of China's imports destined for re-export after assembly. Although these processing imports have fallen relative to China's total imports over recent years, as the first chart shows, they still make up a sizeable share of China's overall inbound goods trade. In an attempt to do exactly that, Xing Yuqing and Manisha Pradhananga at the Asian Development Bank Institute have come up with a measure of external demand which strips out China's processing imports. Then, for good measure, they have factored in an allowance for foreign direct investment into China, which remains driven largely by external, rather than domestic, demand. They found that although the share of external demand in China's GDP has fallen from its high of 28 per cent reached in 2007, in 2011 it still accounted for 22 per cent of overall economic output. As the second chart shows, that's 10 times as great as the share implied by the net export figure commonly used by economists. Xing and Pradhananga conclude that despite efforts to rebalance the economy towards domestic consumption, China is still heavily dependent on demand from the rest of the world, and that its growth remains highly vulnerable to external shocks. In other words, if tomorrow's trade numbers are as dismal as many analysts expect, it will be an ominous sign indeed for China's growth outlook.

#### Chinese economic decline goes global and causes nuclear lashout

Buzan and Foot 04 – professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science; professor of International Relations at St. Anthony College, (Barry and Rosemary, “Does China Matter? A Reassessment: Essays in Memory of Gerald Segal”, ed., Questia, p. 145-147, USC Libraries)//JK

China, East Asia and the world The underlying argument in this section is that there is a strong link between the global standing of a major power and the way that power relates to the other states in its home region. As a general rule, the status of great power, and more so superpower, requires not only that the state concerned be able and willing to project its political influence beyond its immediate region, but that it also be able in some sense to manage, and perhaps lead, its region (Buzan and Wæver, 2003). The U.S. clearly does this in North America, and more arguably for the Western hemisphere as a whole, and the EU does it in Europe. The Soviet Union did it from 1945 to 1989, and the possible inability of Russia to do it (and its desperation to do so) explain the current question marks around its status. India's failure to do it is a big part of what denies it the great-power recognition it craves. During the Cold War, and up to a point still, Japan could exploit its political geography to detach itself from much of Asian politics, and float free as a kind of economic great power. China does not have that kind of geopolitical option. Like Russia and India, it cannot escape regional politics. China's global standing thus depends crucially on what kind of relationship it has with its neighbours. If China is able to reassert some form of hegemony over twenty-first century Asia - getting most or all of its neighbours to bandwagon with it - then its global standing will be hugely enhanced. But if China inspires fear in its neighbours - causing them to balance against it - then like India, and possibly Russia, it will be locked into its region, and its global standing will be diminished. Since the U.S. is strongly present in Asia, its influence also plays into this equation. Indeed, if China is at odds with its neighbours then its position will be worse than that of Russia and India. In their immediate regions, those two have only to deal with powers much smaller than themselves. In China's region there are several very substantial powers whose antagonism would be a real burden. The importance of regional relations for a major power's global standing is easily shown by two extreme scenarios for China's future. In the first, China's development provides it with the strength and the identity to become the central hub of Asia, in the process largely displacing the U.S.. It projects an acceptable political and economic image, and its neighbours bandwagon with it out of some combination of fear, prudence, admiration and hope for economic advantage. Its economy becomes the regional locomotive, and in political and military terms it is acknowledged as primus inter pares by Japan, Korea and the ASEAN states. Japan takes up a similar subordinate relationship with China to that it now has with the U.S., and China is able to use the regional institutions created by ASEAN rather as the U.S. uses the Organization of American States. If the other Asian states fear to antagonize China, and don't balance against it, then China is both free to play a larger global role, and is insulated against pressure from the West. And if China succeeds in positioning itself at the centre of an Asian economy, then it can claim 'locomotive' status along with the U.S. and the EU in the global economy. In the second scenario, China inspires fear in its neighbours. Japan's alliance with the U.S. deepens, and India, Southeast Asia, Japan and possibly Russia coordinate their defences against China, probably with U.S. support. Under the first set of conditions, China acquires a stable regional base which gives it both the status and the capability to play seriously on the global political stage. Under the second set of conditions, China may still be the biggest power in East Asia, but its ability to play on the global stage would be seriously curtailed. The task for this section is thus to examine the social and material forces in play and ask how they might support or block a move in either of these directions. Is it likely that China will acquire hegemony in East Asia, or is its rise to power more likely to produce U.S.-backed regional balancing against it? I will examine the factors playing into this question on three levels: China's capabilities and the trajectory of its internal development; China's relations with its Asian neighbours; and its relationships with the U.S. and the other great powers. China's capabilities and the trajectory of its internal development Debates about China's capability and prospects for development can be placed within a matrix formed by two variables: • Does China get stronger (because its economic development continues successfully) or weaker (because its development runs into obstacles, or triggers socio-political instability)? • Does China become a malign, aggressive, threatening force in international society (because it becomes hypernationalist or fascist), or does it become more benign and cooperative (because economic development brings internal democratization and liberalization)? If China's development falters and it becomes weak, then it will neither dominate its region nor project itself on to the global stage. Whether it is then politically benign or malign will be a much less pressing issue in terms of how others respond to it in the traditional politico-military security domain. What could happen in this scenario is that a breakdown in the socio-political order, perhaps triggered by economic or environmental troubles, might well trigger large-scale migrations, political fragmentations, or wider economic crises that would pose serious threats to China's neighbours. A major political collapse in China could also pose threats at the global level, via the scenario of a failed nuclear weapon state. But, if China becomes strong, then the malign or benign question matters a great deal. The benign and malign options could be alternative paths, or could occur in sequence, with a malign phase giving way to a benign one, as happened with Germany and Japan during their comparable phases of industrialization. The likelihood of just such a sequence was what underpinned Gerry's concern to promote constrainment.

### 4

#### TPA will pass—PC is key

Schneider, 12/17 (Howard, 12/17/2013, “Obama, to sell trade pacts, will outline the benefits of globalization,” <http://www.stltoday.com/business/local/obama-to-sell-trade-pacts-will-outline-the-benefits-of/article_3bebc586-6ed7-50dd-879c-3f331fd54363.html>))

WASHINGTON • After months of international negotiations over two new trade treaties, the Obama administration is planning a major push to make the case that the agreements will put Americans to work at a decent wage and not further winnow the country's manufacturing base.

European and U.S. negotiators are in Washington this week to continue work on an agreement that would mesh the world's two largest economies more closely together. A second proposed treaty, the 12-nation Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), may be finished early next year, creating a trade zone covering 40 percent of world economic output and reaching from Chile to Japan.

The legislation needed for both agreements to clear Congress is expected to be introduced early in 2014, and the administration "is beginning to ramp up" for what could be the most extensive debate in more than a decade over the opportunities and risks of globalization, said an official who was not authorized to speak publicly about the administration's strategy. "We will be mobilizing a whole administration effort to build public and congressional support," the official said.

LIKELY TO BE CONTROVERSIAL

It is likely to be a controversial battle, forcing President Barack Obama to stump for policies that some of his strongest political allies — particularly organized labor and environmental groups — are likely to oppose. It is a debate set against the backdrop of 7 percent unemployment and concern about the loss of U.S. jobs that coincided with the rise of manufacturing power in countries such as China.

The measures under consideration would cover the bulk of global economic activity and reshape economic relations around the globe — setting the first rules for new industries that are thriving thanks to the Internet and renegotiating standards for old ones such as shoemaking.

Obama has focused much of his recent economic policy on boosting trade and global investment. He will now need to make the case that a broad new set of trade agreements will help U.S. workers and not merely shift jobs overseas or benefit a small clique of global corporations, as many trade skeptics argue has happened before.

SETTING 'THE RULES OF THE GAME'

These agreements "will set the rules of the game … in a way that levels the playing field and allows our workers to compete more effectively. If we don't do that, the rules will be set by others," U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman said Tuesday. Chinese economic influence in Asia is a particular concern.

"At the end of the day, when the deal is done, we will be able to explain to everybody the balances that we struck and we will have support for the substance of it," Froman said.

The countries involved range from long-standing U.S. industrial allies such as Germany and Japan to developing nations such as Vietnam and Malaysia, each posing its own challenges in completing the agreements and winning support in the United States.

A more open Japanese auto market could be of great benefit to U.S. manufacturers, for example, while the administration envisions Vietnam becoming a geopolitically important model of how a government-planned economy can transition to a system of stronger individual rights and more market-based rules for state-run enterprises.

DOMESTIC OPPOSITION

Several major union leaders, as well as some corporate executives and civil society groups, have been skeptical that those benefits will ever be realized and argue that the TPP in particular is being negotiated with such little public disclosure that it is hard to judge the potential effects.

On Capitol Hill, there is ill will to overcome from the recent government shutdown and controversy over the rollout of the health-care law. Unemployment is high and a core group of Democrats feels that prior trade agreements — from Clinton-era treaties with Mexico and Canada to the decision to let China join the World Trade Organization — have helped hollow out America's manufacturing middle class.

Democrats who favor trade — including important figures such as Rep. Sander Levin, D-Mich., — want tougher guarantees in any upcoming treaty, including enforceable rules to ensure that major trading partners don't unfairly manipulate the value of their currencies to gain advantage.

Civil society groups have raised a myriad of complaints, and the usually pro-trade GOP may splinter as members affiliated with the tea party movement argue against providing Obama with the same authority that presidents since Gerald Ford have been given to negotiate trade treaties without fear of congressional amendment.

FIRST BATTLE: 'FAST-TRACK AUTHORITY'

In fact, the first battle will be over not a trade agreement but that "fast-track" authority. Fast-track rules let Congress set negotiating parameters for the administration but requires any subsequent treaty to receive a quick up-or-down vote without amendment — a way to assure negotiating partners that deals will not be returned with a long list of congressional changes to barter over.

The Republican and Democratic chairmen of the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee are working on a trade promotion authority bill expected to be introduced early in 2014. That will be the forum to work out some of the major fears or complaints lawmakers have voiced over the TPP and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with Europe.

Obama "needs to make clear this is important," said Jake Colvin, a vice president of the National Foreign Trade Council, a business lobby. "Potentially there is a significant amount of support in the center among Democrats and Republicans to get it over the line."

Free-trade agreements with South Korea, Colombia and Panama have been approved under Obama. But they originally dated to the Bush administration and were covered by fast-track laws that have since expired.

POLITICALLY FRAUGHT DEBATE

The last debate over trade promotion authority, in 2002, showed how narrow and politically fraught the margins can become: The measure was approved 215 to 212 in the House on a largely party-line vote.

The politics of trade since then have arguably become more intense. The U.S. sway over the world economic system was rocked by the financial crisis, and China's rapid growth has led U.S. unions, politicians and others to insist that future trade agreements not only open markets but also ensure that U.S. workers are not left at a disadvantage.

New "21st century" issues such as the transfer of data across national borders, intellectual property rules for biotechnology, and appropriate regulations for state-owned enterprises are being negotiated for the first time, alongside age-old disputes over agriculture and whether cheese from somewhere other than Roquefort-sur-Soulzon smells just as sweet.

When the latest round of Pacific talks ended this month in Singapore, House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Dave Camp, R-Mich, said there had been "considerable bipartisan and bicameral progress" on a trade promotion bill.

He said he felt legislation could pass "early next year, if we have the administration's active participation."

#### Plan kills PC and focus

Shear, 13

(Michael, NYT White house correspondent, 5/5, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/05/world/americas/in-latin-america-us-shifts-focus-from-drug-war-to-economy.html?pagewanted=all>)

Last week, Mr. Obama returned to capitals in Latin America with a vastly different message. Relationships with countries racked by drug violence and organized crime should focus more on economic development and less on the endless battles against drug traffickers and organized crime capos that have left few clear victors. The countries, Mexico in particular, need to set their own course on security, with the United States playing more of a backing role. That approach runs the risk of being seen as kowtowing to governments more concerned about their public image than the underlying problems tarnishing it. Mexico, which is eager to play up its economic growth, has mounted an aggressive effort to play down its crime problems, going as far as to encourage the news media to avoid certain slang words in reports. “The problem will not just go away,” said Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue. “It needs to be tackled head-on, with a comprehensive strategy that includes but goes beyond stimulating economic growth and alleviating poverty. “Obama becomes vulnerable to the charge of downplaying the region’s overriding issue, and the chief obstacle to economic progress,” he added. “It is fine to change the narrative from security to economics as long as the reality on the ground reflects and fits with the new story line.” Administration officials insist that Mr. Obama remains cleareyed about the security challenges, but the new emphasis corresponds with a change in focus by the Mexican government. The new Mexican president, Enrique Peña Nieto, took office in December vowing to reduce the violence that exploded under the militarized approach to the drug war adopted by his predecessor, Felipe Calderón. That effort left about 60,000 Mexicans dead and appears not to have significantly damaged the drug-trafficking industry. In addition to a focus on reducing violence, which some critics have interpreted as taking a softer line on the drug gangs, Mr. Peña Nieto has also moved to reduce American involvement in law enforcement south of the border. With friction and mistrust between American and Mexican law enforcement agencies growing, Mr. Obama suggested that the United States would no longer seek to dominate the security agenda. “It is obviously up to the Mexican people to determine their security structures and how it engages with other nations, including the United States,” he said, standing next to Mr. Peña Nieto on Thursday in Mexico City. “But the main point I made to the president is that we support the Mexican government’s focus on reducing violence, and we look forward to continuing our good cooperation in any way that the Mexican government deems appropriate.” In some ways, conceding leadership of the drug fight to Mexico hews to a guiding principle of Mr. Obama’s foreign policy, in which American supremacy is played down, at least publicly, in favor of a multilateral approach. But that philosophy could collide with the concerns of lawmakers in Washington, who have expressed frustration with what they see as a lack of clarity in Mexico’s security plans. And security analysts say the entrenched corruption in Mexican law enforcement has long clouded the partnership with their American counterparts. Putting Mexico in the driver’s seat on security marks a shift in a balance of power that has always tipped to the United States and, analysts said, will carry political risk as Congress negotiates an immigration bill that is expected to include provisions for tighter border security. “If there is a perception in the U.S. Congress that security cooperation is weakening, that could play into the hands of those who oppose immigration reform,” said Vanda Felbab-Brown, a counternarcotics expert at the Brookings Institution in Washington. “Realistically, the border is as tight as could be and there have been few spillovers of the violence from Mexico into the U.S.,” she added, but perceptions count in Washington “and can be easily distorted.” “Drugs today are not very important to the U.S. public over all,” she added, “but they are important to committed drug warriors who are politically powerful.” Representative Michael T. McCaul, a Texas Republican who is chairman of the Homeland Security Committee, has warned against the danger of drug cartels forming alliances with terrorist groups. “While these threats exist, you would be surprised to find that the administration thinks its work here is done,” he wrote in an opinion article for Roll Call last month, pressing for more border controls in the bill. The Obama administration has said any evidence of such cooperation is very thin, but even without terrorist connections, drug gangs pose threats to peace and security. Human rights advocates said they feared the United States would ease pressure on Mexico to investigate disappearances and other abuses at the hands of the police and military, who have received substantial American support. The shift in approach “suggests that the Obama administration either doesn’t object to these abusive practices or is only willing to raise such concerns when it’s politically convenient,” said José Miguel Vivanco, director of Human Rights Watch’s Americas division. Still, administration officials have said there may have been an overemphasis on the bellicose language and high-profile hunts for cartel leaders while the real problem of lawlessness worsens. American antidrug aid is shifting more toward training police and shoring up judicial systems that have allowed criminals to kill with impunity in Mexico and Central America. United States officials said Mr. Obama remains well aware of the region’s problems with security, even as he is determined that they not overshadow the economic opportunities. It is clear Mr. Obama, whatever his words four years ago, now believes there has been too much security talk. In a speech to Mexican students on Friday, Mr. Obama urged people in the two countries to look beyond a one-dimensional focus on what he called real security concerns, saying it is “time for us to put the old mind-sets aside.” And he repeated the theme later in the day in Costa Rica, lamenting that when it comes to the United States and Central America, “so much of the focus ends up being on security.” “We also have to recognize that problems like narco-trafficking arise in part when a country is vulnerable because of poverty, because of institutions that are not working for the people, because young people don’t see a brighter future ahead,” Mr. Obama said in a news conference with Laura Chinchilla, the president of Costa Rica.

#### TPA critical to completing free trade deals

Chicago Tribune, 12/30 (“Editorial: Obama needs fast-track trade authority,” 12/30/2013, <http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/editorials/ct-give-obama-tpa-fast-track-trade-edit-1230-jm-20131230,0,527893.story>))

President Barack Obama wants the power to negotiate free-trade treaties on a fast track. With Trade Promotion Authority, he would have a good chance of clinching huge trade pacts now being hammered out with Europe and Asia. Yet Congress may not give him that authority — for all the wrong reasons.

Over the years, Congress has recognized that negotiating trade deals requires special legislative procedures. Under ordinary rules, a trade deal would be subject to Capitol Hill amendments that in effect enable Congress to reopen negotiations after they are concluded. In that event, knowing that America's representatives couldn't deliver on their promises, trade partners would have no incentive to make concessions at the bargaining table. As a practical matter, making a deal becomes impossible.

TPA, as it is known, also ensures that Congress considers any trade deals on a reasonable timetable, not letting them languish indefinitely. Under TPA, Congress can reject a deal the administration cuts, but a few opponents can't block a vote.

**Trade wars go nuclear**

**Miller and Elwood** **98** (Vincent and James, Founder and Vice-President of the International Society for Individual Liberty, “Free Trade or Proectionism? The Case Against Trade Restrictions,” www.isil.org/resources/lit/free-trade-protectionism.html)

WHEN GOODS DON'T CROSS BORDERS, ARMIES OFTEN DO History is not lacking in examples of cold trade wars escalating into hot shooting wars: Europe suffered from almost non-stop wars during the 17th and 18th centuries, when restrictive trade policy (mercantilism) was the rule; rival governments fought each other to expand their empires and to exploit captive markets. British tariffs provoked the American colonists to revolution, and later the Northern-dominated US government imposed restrictions on Southern cotton exports - a major factor leading to the American Civil War. In the late 19th Century, after a half century of general free trade (which brought a half-century of peace), short-sighted politicians throughout Europe again began erecting trade barriers. Hostilities built up until they eventually exploded into World War I. In 1930, facing only a mild recession, US President Hoover ignored warning pleas in a petition by 1028 prominent economists and signed the notorious Smoot-Hawley Act, which raised some tariffs to 100% levels. Within a year, over 25 other governments had retaliated by passing similar laws. The result? World trade came to a grinding halt, and the entire world was plunged into the "Great Depression" for the rest of the decade. The depression in turn led to World War II. THE #1 DANGER TO WORLD PEACE The world enjoyed its greatest economic growth during the relatively free trade period of 1945-1970, a period that also saw no major wars. Yet we again see trade barriers being raised around the world by short-sighted politicians. Will the world again end up in a shooting war as a result of these economically-deranged policies? Can we afford to allow this to happen in the nuclear age? "What generates war is the economic philosophy of nationalism: embargoes, trade and foreign exchange controls, monetary devaluation, etc. The philosophy of protectionism is a philosophy of war."

## Case

#### Cyberattacks won’t escalate – empirics

Libicki 8/16

(Martin C. Libicki, Senior Management Scientist at the RAND Corporation and a Visiting Professor at the U.S. Naval Academy, Foreign Affairs, 8/16/2013, “Don't Buy the Cyberhype,” http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139819/martin-c-libicki/dont-buy-the-cyberhype, HSA)

Although the risk of a debilitating cyberattack is real, the perception of that risk is far greater than it actually is. No person has ever died from a cyberattack, and only one alleged cyberattack has ever crippled a piece of critical infrastructure, causing a series of local power outages in Brazil. In fact, a major cyberattack of the kind intelligence officials fear has not taken place in the 21 years since the Internet became accessible to the public.¶ Thus, while a cyberattack could theoretically disable infrastructure or endanger civilian lives, its effects would unlikely reach the scale U.S. officials have warned of. The immediate and direct damage from a major cyberattack on the United States could range anywhere from zero to tens of billions of dollars, but the latter would require a broad outage of electric power or something of comparable damage. Direct casualties would most likely be limited, and indirect causalities would depend on a variety of factors such as whether the attack disabled emergency 911 dispatch services. Even in that case, there would have to be no alternative means of reaching first responders for such an attack to cause casualties. The indirect effects might be greater if a cyberattack caused a large loss of confidence, particularly in the banking system. Yet scrambled records would probably prove insufficient to incite a run on the banks.

#### STEM high now – Nobel proves

Bruner 11 (Jon, Forbes, October 5, 2011, “American Leadership in Science, Measured in Nobel Prizes [Infographic],” <http://www.forbes.com/sites/jonbruner/2011/10/05/nobel-prizes-and-american-leadership-in-science-infographic/>, alp)

The graphic below demonstrates one of America’s most important strengths: its complete dominance of basic scientific research. Each day this week, phone calls will go out from Stockholm or Oslo to tell distinguished academics, writers and peacemakers that they’ve won a Nobel Prize. And, as they have for several decades, a majority of those calls will most likely go to American academics. That says a great deal about America’s place in the academy. The United States has won more Nobel prizes for physics, chemistry, physiology or medicine, and economics since World War II than any other country, by a wide margin (it has been less dominant in literature and peace, two awards that are much more broadly distributed among nations). At least one American has won a prize each year since 1935 (excluding the years 1940 through 1942, when no prizes were given out). And the United States became dominant after a very slow start: no American won a science prize in the first six years of the prize’s existence.

#### No impact to hegemony:

#### 1) Overstretch

Maher 11**—**PhD candidate in Political Science @ Brown

Richard, Ph.D. candidate in the Political Science department at Brown University, The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States Will Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World, 11/12/2011 Orbis, ScienceDirect

To protect itself from emerging or even future threats, preeminent states may be more likely to take unilateral action, particularly compared to when power is distributed more evenly in the international system. Preeminence has not only made it possible for the United States to overestimate its power, but also to overestimate the degree to which other states and societies see American power as legitimate and even as worthy of emulation. There is almost a belief in historical determinism, or the feeling that one was destined to stand atop world politics as a colossus, and this preeminence gives one a special prerogative for one’s role and purpose in world politics. The security doctrine that the George W. Bush administration adopted took an aggressive approach to maintaining American preeminence and eliminating threats to American security, including waging preventive war. The invasion of Iraq, based on claims that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and had ties to al Qaeda, both of which turned out to be false, produced huge costs for the United States—in political, material, and human terms. After seven years of war, tens of thousands of American military personnel remain in Iraq. Estimates of its long-term cost are in the trillions of dollars.15 At the same time, the United States has fought a parallel conflict in Afghanistan. While the Obama administration looks to dramatically reduce the American military presence in Iraq, President Obama has committed tens of thousands of additional U.S. troops to Afghanistan. Distraction. Preeminent states have a tendency to seek to shape world politics in fundamental ways, which can lead to conflicting priorities and unnecessary diversions. As resources, attention, and prestige are devoted to one issue or set of issues, others are necessarily disregarded or given reduced importance. There are always trade-offs and opportunity costs in international politics, even for a state as powerful as the United States. Most states are required to define their priorities in highly specific terms. Because the preeminent state has such a large stake in world politics, it feels the need to be vigilant against any changes that could impact its short-, medium-, or longterm interests. The result is taking on commitments on an expansive number of issues all over the globe. The United States has been very active in its ambition to shape the postCold War world. It has expanded NATO to Russia’s doorstep; waged war in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan; sought to export its own democratic principles and institutions around the world; assembled an international coalition against transnational terrorism; imposed sanctions on North Korea and Iran for their nuclear programs; undertaken ‘‘nation building’’ in Iraq and Afghanistan; announced plans for a missile defense system to be stationed in Poland and the Czech Republic; and, with the United Kingdom, led the response to the recent global financial and economic crisis. By being so involved in so many parts of the world, there often emerges ambiguity over priorities. The United States defines its interests and obligations in global terms, and defending all of them simultaneously is beyond the pale even for a superpower like the United States. Issues that may have received benign neglect during the Cold War, for example, when U.S. attention and resources were almost exclusively devoted to its strategic competition with the Soviet Union, are now viewed as central to U.S. interests. Bearing Disproportionate Costs of Maintaining the Status Quo. As the preeminent power, the United States has the largest stake in maintaining the status quo. The world the United States took the lead in creating—one based on open markets and free trade, democratic norms and institutions, private property rights and the rule of law—has created enormous benefits for the United States. This is true both in terms of reaching unprecedented levels of domestic prosperity and in institutionalizing U.S. preferences, norms, and values globally. But at the same time, this system has proven costly to maintain. Smaller, less powerful states have a strong incentive to free ride, meaning that preeminent states bear a disproportionate share of the costs of maintaining the basic rules and institutions that give world politics order, stability, and predictability. While this might be frustrating to U.S. policymakers, it is perfectly understandable. Other countries know that the United States will continue to provide these goods out of its own self-interest, so there is little incentive for these other states to contribute significant resources to help maintain these public goods.16 The U.S. Navy patrols the oceans keeping vital sea lanes open. During financial crises around the globe—such as in Asia in 1997-1998, Mexico in 1994, or the global financial and economic crisis that began in October 2008— the U.S. Treasury rather than the IMF takes the lead in setting out and implementing a plan to stabilize global financial markets. The United States has spent massive amounts on defense in part to prevent great power war. The United States, therefore, provides an indisputable collective good—a world, particularly compared to past eras, that is marked by order, stability, and predictability. A number of countries—in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia—continue to rely on the American security guarantee for their own security. Rather than devoting more resources to defense, they are able to finance generous social welfare programs. To maintain these commitments, the United States has accumulated staggering budget deficits and national debt. As the sole superpower, the United States bears an additional though different kind of weight. From the Israeli-Palestinian dispute to the India Pakistan rivalry over Kashmir, the United States is expected to assert leadership to bring these disagreements to a peaceful resolution. The United States puts its reputation on the line, and as years and decades pass without lasting settlements, U.S. prestige and influence is further eroded. The only way to get other states to contribute more to the provision of public goods is if the United States dramatically decreases its share. At the same time, the United States would have to give other states an expanded role and greater responsibility given the proportionate increase in paying for public goods. This is a political decision for the United States—maintain predominant control over the provision of collective goods or reduce its burden but lose influence in how these public goods are used. Creation of Feelings of Enmity and Anti-Americanism. It is not necessary that everyone admire the United States or accept its ideals, values, and goals. Indeed, such dramatic imbalances of power that characterize world politics today almost always produce in others feelings of mistrust, resentment, and outright hostility. At the same time, it is easier for the United States to realize its own goals and values when these are shared by others, and are viewed as legitimate and in the common interest.

#### 2) Anti-Americanism

Maher 11**—**PhD candidate in Political Science @ Brown

Richard, Ph.D. candidate in the Political Science department at Brown University, The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States Will Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World, 11/12/2011 Orbis, ScienceDirect

As a result of both its vast power but also some of the decisions it has made, particularly over the past eight years, feelings of resentment and hostility toward the United States have grown, and perceptions of the legitimacy of its role and place in the world have correspondingly declined. Multiple factors give rise toanti-American sentiment, and anti-Americanism takes different shapes and forms.17 It emerges partly as a response to the vast disparity in power the United States enjoys over other states. Taking satisfaction in themissteps and indiscretions of the imposing Gulliver is a natural reaction. In societies that globalization (which in many parts of the world is interpreted as equivalent to Americanization) has largely passed over, resentment and alienation are felt when comparing one’s own impoverished, ill-governed, unstable society with the wealth, stability, and influence enjoyed by the United States.18 Anti-Americanism also emerges as a consequence of specific American actions and certain values and principles to which the United States ascribes. Opinion polls showed that a dramatic rise in anti-American sentiment followed the perceived unilateral decision to invade Iraq (under pretences that failed to convince much of the rest of the world) and to depose Saddam Hussein and his government and replace itwith a governmentmuchmore friendly to the United States. To many, this appeared as an arrogant and completely unilateral decision by a single state to decide for itselfwhen—and under what conditions—military force could be used. A number of other policy decisions by not just the George W. Bush but also the Clinton and Obama administrations have provoked feelings of anti-American sentiment. However, it seemed that a large portion of theworld had a particular animus for GeorgeW. Bush and a number of policy decisions of his administration, from voiding the U.S. signature on the International Criminal Court (ICC), resisting a global climate change treaty, detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib in Iraq and at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, and what many viewed as a simplistic worldview that declared a ‘‘war’’ on terrorism and the division of theworld between goodand evil.Withpopulations around theworld mobilized and politicized to a degree never before seen—let alone barely contemplated—such feelings of anti-American sentiment makes it more difficult for the United States to convince other governments that the U.S.’ own preferences and priorities are legitimate and worthy of emulation. Decreased Allied Dependence. It is counterintuitive to think that America’s unprecedented power decreases its allies’ dependence on it. During the Cold War, for example, America’s allies were highly dependent on the United States for their own security. The security relationship that the United States had with Western Europe and Japan allowed these societies to rebuild and reach a stunning level of economic prosperity in the decades following World War II. Now that the United States is the sole superpower and the threat posed by the Soviet Union no longer exists, these countries have charted more autonomous courses in foreign and security policy.

#### 3) Empirics prove

Fettweis 10 – Professor of national security affairs at U.S. Naval War College (Christopher J., “Threat and Anxiety in US Foreign Policy,” Informaworld, Survival, Volume 52, Issue 2 April 2010 , pages 59 – 82)

One potential explanation for the growth of global peace can be dismissed fairly quickly: US actions do not seem to have contributed much. The limited evidence suggests that there is little reason to believe in the stabilizing power of the US hegemon, and that there is no relation between the relative level of American activism and international stability. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990, a 25% reduction.29 To internationalists, defense hawks and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible 'peace dividend' endangered both national and global security. 'No serious analyst of American military capabilities', argued neo-conservatives William Kristol and Robert Kagan in 1996, 'doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America's responsibilities to itself and to world peace'.30 And yet the verdict from the 1990s is fairly plain: the world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable US military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races; no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the US military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in US military capabilities. Most of all, the United States was no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Bill Clinton, and kept declining as the George W. Bush administration ramped the spending back up. Complex statistical analysis is unnecessary to reach the conclusion that world peace and US military expenditure are unrelated.

**Heg doesn’t solve China war**

**Eland, Ph.D. in security, 6** Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute and Ph.D. in national security policy from George Washington University. (Ivan, Is Future Conflict with China Unavoidable, Independent Institute Working Paper Number 63, Jan18)

Yet every adverse development in the world—particularly in East Asia—does not pose a threat to U.S. security. China may continue to enjoy rapid economic growth and become more assertive. Unlike in the 1930s, however, when Imperial Japan was expanding throughout East Asia, **other counterweights** to a rising great power **exist in the region** **today**. Prior to World War II, European empires—French, British, and Dutch—with colonial possessions in East Asia were overstretched and in decline. Although the vast distances of the Pacifi c Ocean separated the United States and Japan, the United States was the only power that could counter the potential Japanese hegemon. Now, however, if containing China becomes necessary (and it may not), India, Russia, and Japan might cooperate or form an alliance to do so. India and Russia have capable nuclear arsenals, and Japan has the wealth and technological capability to become a capable counterweight to China. Those three larger powers might be assisted by smaller, wealthy nations such as Australia, Taiwan, and South Korea. Those Asian countries might form the first line of defense against a rising China, thus allowing the United States to take advantage of the large Pacifi c moat separating China from the American homeland. Such vast separation over water should make China and the United States less threatening to each other because traversing a large body of water to invade another country is diffi - cult. Th e large physical separation over water between Japan and the United States did not prevent World War II because of the aforementioned power vacuum in East Asia, but that power vacuum no longer exists with all the powerful and wealthy counterweights to a rising China.

#### No impact to heg – empirics

Fettweis 10 – Professor of national security affairs at U.S. Naval War College (Christopher J., “Threat and Anxiety in US Foreign Policy,” Informaworld, Survival, Volume 52, Issue 2 April 2010 , pages 59 – 82)

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**Econ resilient—empirics**

**Zakaria, 9**—, PhD in pol sci Editor of Newsweek, BA from Yale, PhD in pol sci, Harvard. He serves on the board of Yale University, The Council on Foreign Relations, The Trilateral Commission, and Shakespeare and Company. Named "one of the 21 most important people of the 21st Century" (Fareed, The Secrets of Stability, 12 December 2009, http://www.fareedzakaria.com/articles/articles.html, AMiles)

One year ago, the world seemed as if it might be coming apart. The global financial system, which had fueled a great expansion of capitalism and trade across the world,was crumbling. All the certainties of the age of globalization—about the virtues of free markets, trade, and technology—were being called into question. Faith in the American model had collapsed. The financial industry had crumbled. Once-roaring emerging markets like China, India, and Brazil were sinking. Worldwide trade was shrinking to a degree not seen since the 1930s.  Pundits whose bearishness had been vindicated predicted we were doomed to a long, painful bust, with cascading failures in sector after sector, country after country. In a widely cited essay that appeared in The Atlantic this May, Simon Johnson, former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, wrote: "The conventional wisdom among the elite is still that the current slump 'cannot be as bad as the Great Depression.' This view is wrong. What we face now could, in fact, be worse than the Great Depression."  Others predicted that these economic shocks would lead to political instability and violence in the worst-hit countries. At his confirmation hearing in February, the new U.S. director of national intelligence, Adm. Dennis Blair, cautioned the Senate that "the financial crisis and global recession are likely to produce a wave of economic crises in emerging-market nations over the next year." Hillary Clinton endorsed this grim view. And she was hardly alone. Foreign Policy ran a cover story predicting serious unrest in several emerging markets.  Of one thing everyone was sure: nothing would ever be the same again. Not the financial industry, not capitalism, not globalization.  One year later, how much has the world really changed? Well, Wall Street is home to two fewer investment banks (three, if you count Merrill Lynch). Some regional banks have gone bust. There was some turmoil in Moldova and (entirely unrelated to the financial crisis) in Iran. Severe problems remain, like high unemployment in the West, and we face new problems caused by responses to the crisis—soaringdebt and fears of inflation. But overall, things look nothing like they did in the 1930s. The predictions of economic and political collapse have not materialized at all.  A key measure of fear and fragility is the ability of poor and unstablecountries to borrow money on the debt markets. So consider this: the sovereign bonds of tottering Pakistan have returned 168 percent so far this year. All this doesn't add up to a recovery yet, but itdoes reflect a return to some level of normalcy. And that rebound has been so rapid that even the shrewdest observers remain puzzled. "The question I have at the back of my head is 'Is that it?' " says Charles Kaye, the co-head of Warburg Pincus. "We had this huge crisis, and now we're back to business as usual?"  This revival did not happen because markets managed to stabilize themselves on their own. Rather, governments, having learned the lessons of the Great Depression, were determined not to repeat the same mistakesonce this crisis hit. By massively expanding state support for the economy—through central banks and national treasuries—they buffered the worst of the damage. (Whether they made new mistakes in the process remains to be seen.) The extensive social safety nets that have been established across the industrialized world also cushioned the pain felt by many. Times are still tough, but things are nowhere near as bad as in the 1930s, when governments played a tiny role in national economies.  It's true that the massive stateinterventions of the past year may be fueling some new bubbles: the cheap cash and government guarantees provided to banks, companies, and consumers have fueled some irrational exuberance in stock and bond markets. Yet these rallies also demonstrate the return of confidence, and confidence is a very powerful economic force. When John Maynard Keynes described his own prescriptions for economic growth, he believed government action could provide only a temporary fix until the real motor of the economy started cranking again—the animal spirits of investors, consumers, and companies seeking risk and profit.  Beyond all this, though, I believe there's a fundamental reason why we have not faced global collapse in the last year. It is the same reason that we weathered the stock-market crash of 1987, the recession of 1992, the Asian crisis of 1997, the Russian default of 1998, and the tech-bubble collapse of 2000. The current global economic system is inherently more resilient than we think.

**No impact to collapse—liberalism**

**Zakaria, 9**—, PhD in pol sci Editor of Newsweek, BA from Yale, PhD in pol sci, Harvard. He serves on the board of Yale University, The Council on Foreign Relations, The Trilateral Commission, and Shakespeare and Company. Named "one of the 21 most important people of the 21st Century" (Fareed, The Secrets of Stability, 12 December 2009, http://www.fareedzakaria.com/articles/articles.html, AMiles)

The world today is characterized by three major forces for stability, each reinforcing the other and each historical in nature.  The first is the spread of great-power peace. Since the end of the Cold War, the world's major powers have not competed with each other in geomilitary terms. There have been some political tensions, but measured by historical standards the globe today is stunningly free of friction between the mightiest nations. This lack of conflict is extremely rare in history. You would have to go back at least 175 years, if not 400, to find any prolonged period like the one we are living in. The number of people who have died as a result of wars, civil conflicts, and terrorism over the last 30 years has declined sharply (despite what you might think on the basis of overhyped fears about terrorism). And no wonder—three decades ago, the Soviet Union was still funding militias, governments, and guerrillas in dozens of countries around the world. And the United States was backing the other side in every one of those places. That clash of superpower proxies caused enormous bloodshed and instability: recall that 3 million people died in Indochina alone during the 1970s. Nothing like that is happening today.  Peace is like oxygen, Harvard's Joseph Nye has written. When you don't have it, it's all you can think about, but when you do, you don't appreciate your good fortune. Peace allows for the possibility of a stable economic life and trade. The peace that flowed from the end of the Cold Warhad a much larger effect because it was accompanied by the discrediting of socialism. The world was left with a sole superpower but also a single workable economic model—capitalism—albeit with many variants from Sweden to Hong Kong.  This consensus enabled the expansion of the global economy; in fact, it created for the first time a single world economy in which almost all countries across the globe were participants. That means everyone is invested in the same system. Today, whilethe nations of Eastern Europe might face an economic crisis, no one is suggesting that they abandon free-market capitalism and return to communism. In fact, around the world you see the opposite: even in the midst of this downturn, there have been few successful electoral appeals for a turn to socialism or a rejection of the current framework of political economy. Center-right parties have instead prospered in recent elections throughout the West.  The second force for stability is the victory—after a decades-long struggle—over the cancer of inflation. Thirty-five years ago, much of the world was plagued by high inflation, with deep social and political consequences. Severe inflation can be far more disruptive than a recession, because while recessions rob you of better jobs and wages that you might have had in the future, inflation robs you of what you have now by destroying your savings. In many countries in the 1970s, hyperinflation led to the destruction of the middle class, which was the background condition for many of the political dramas of the era—coups in Latin America, the suspension of democracy in India, the overthrow of the shah in Iran. But then in 1979, the tide began to turn when Paul Volcker took over the U.S. Federal Reserve and waged war against inflation. Over two decades, central banks managed to decisively beat down the beast. At this point, only one country in the world suffers from hyperinflation: Zimbabwe. Low inflation allows people, businesses, and governments to plan for the future, a key precondition for stability.  Political and economic stability have each reinforced the other. And the third force that has underpinned the resilience of the global system is technological connectivity.Globalization has always existed in a sense in the modern world, but until recently its contours were mostly limited to trade: countries made goods and sold them abroad. Today the information revolution has created a much more deeply connected global system. Managers in Arkansas can work with suppliers in Beijing on a real-time basis. The production of almost every complex manufactured product now involves input from a dozen countries in a tight global supply chain. And the consequences of connectivity go well beyond economics. Women in rural India have learned through satellite television about the independence of women in more modern countries. Citizens in Iran have used cell phones and the Internet to connect to their well-wishers beyond their borders. Globalization today is fundamentally about knowledge being dispersed across our world.  This diffusion of knowledge may actually be the most important reason for the stability of the current system. The majority of the world's nations have learned some basic lessons about political well-being and wealth creation. They have taken advantage of the opportunities provided by peace, low inflation, and technology to plug in to the global system. And they have seen the indisputable results. Despite all the turmoil of the past year, it's important to remember that more people have been lifted out of poverty over the last two decades than in the preceding 10. Clear-thinking citizens around the world are determined not to lose these gains by falling for some ideological chimera, or searching for a worker's utopia. They are even cautious about the appeals of hypernationalism and war. Most have been there, done that. And they know the price.

**US not key to global economy**

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In fact, the most remarkable development in the last few years has been the way China, India, Brazil, and other emerging markets have managed their affairs prudently, taming growth by keeping interest rates up and restricting credit in the middle of the bubble—just as aneconomics textbook (and common sense) would advise. Instead it was the advanced industrial world, which had always lectured everyone else about good political and economic management, that handled its affairs poorly, fueling bubble after bubble, being undisciplined in the boom, and now suffering most during the bust. The data reflect this new reality. By 2014 the debt of the rich countries in the G20 will be 120 percent of GDP, three times the level of debt in the big emerging-market countries. The students of the global system are now doing better than their teachers. Among the many realities that have become apparent in the last year, this is perhaps the most consequential. People in the West were quick to write off the developing nations after the crash, sure that they could not survive a recession in the centers of the global economy.But the strongest of the emerging markets have actually emerged. They have become large, mature, and connected enough that while affected by the West, their fortunes are not entirely dependent on it.  There is now significant domestic demand in countries like India. The government has massive resources in China. And these nations now trade a great deal with each other. China has overtaken the United States as India's largest trading partner. This power shift may prove the longest-lasting legacy of the crisis of 2008. How the established countries deal with it, and how they handle their own economic woes in the midst of many competing economic centers, will be their primary challenge in the next decade. If they cannot adjust, then the world might not remain so stable after all.

#### Their internal link can’t affect the structural factors their impact ev points to

Maher 11—adjunct prof of pol sci, Brown. PhD expected in 2011 in pol sci, Brown (Richard, The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States May Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World, Orbis 55;1, Amiles)

The United States should start planning now for the inevitable decline of its preeminent position in world politics. By taking steps now, the United States will be able to position itself to exercise maximum influence beyond its era of preponderance. This will be America’s fourth attempt at world order. The first, following World War I and the creation of the League of Nations, was a disaster. The second and third, coming in 1945 and 1989-1991, respectively, should be considered significant achievements of U.S. foreign policy and of creating world order. This fourth attempt at world order will go a long way in determining the basic shape and character of world politics and international history for the twenty-first century. The most fundamental necessity for the United States is to create a stable political order that is likely to endure, and that provides for stable relations among the great powers. The United States and other global stakeholders must prevent a return to the 1930s, an era defined by open trade conflict, power competition, and intense nationalism. Fortunately, the United States is in a good position to do this. The global political order that now exists is largely of American creation. Moreover, its forward presence in Europe and East Asia will likely persist for decades to come, ensuring that the United States will remain a major player in these regions. The disparity in military power between the United States and the rest of the world is profound, and this gap will not close in the next several decades at least. In creating a new global political order for twenty-first century world politics, the United States will have to rely on both the realist and liberal traditions of American foreign policy, which will include deterrence and power balancing, but also using international institutions to shape other countries’ preferences and interests. Adapt International Institutions for a New Era of World Politics. The United States should seek to ensure that the global rules, institutions, and norms that it took the lead in creating—which reflect basic American preferences and interests, thus constituting an important element of American power—outlive American preeminence. We know that institutions acquire a certain ‘‘stickiness’’ that allow them to exist long after the features or forces at the time of their creation give way to a new landscape of global politics. The transaction costs of creating a whole new international—or even regional— institutional architecture that would compete with the American post-World War II vintage would be enormous. Institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and World Trade Organization (WTO), all reflect basic American preferences for an open trading system and, with a few exceptions, have near-universal membership and overwhelming legitimacy. Even states with which the United States has significant political, economic, or diplomatic disagreement—China, Russia, and Iran—have strongly desired membership in these ‘‘Made in USA’’ institutions. Shifts in the global balance of power will be reflected in these institutions—such as the decision at the September 2009 Pittsburgh G-20 summit to increase China’s voting weight in the IMF by five percentage points, largely at the expense of European countries such as Britain and France. Yet these institutions, if their evolution is managed with deftness and skill, will disproportionately benefit the United States long after the demise of its unparalleled position in world politics. In this sense, the United States will be able to ‘‘lock in’’ a durable international order that will continue to reflect its own basic interests and values. Importantly, the United States should seek to use its vast power in the broad interest of the world, not simply for its own narrow or parochial interests. During the second half of the twentieth century the United States pursued its own interests but also served the interests of the world more broadly. And there was intense global demand for the collective goods and services the United States provided. The United States, along with Great Britain, are history’s only two examples of liberal empires. Rather than an act of altruism, this will improve America’s strategic position. States and societies that are prosperous and stable are less likely to display aggressive or antagonistic behavior in their foreign policies. There are things the United States can do that would hasten the end of American preeminence, and acting in a seemingly arbitrary, capricious, and unilateral manner is one of them. The more the rest of the world views the American-made world as legitimate, and as serving their own interests, the less likely they will be to seek to challenge or even transform it.19 Cultivate Balance of Power Relationships in Other Regions. The United States enjoys better relations with most states than these states do with their regional neighbors. South and East Asia are regions in which distrust, resentment, and outright hostility abound. The United States enjoys relatively strong (if far from perfect) strategic relationships with most of the major states in Asia, including Japan, India, Pakistan, and South Korea. The United States and China have their differences, and a more intense strategic rivalry could develop between the two. However, right now the relationship is generally stable. With the possible exception of China (but perhaps even Beijing views the American military presence in East Asia as an assurance against Japanese revanchism), these countries prefer a U.S. presence in Asia, and in fact view good relations with the United States as indispensable for their own security.

# 2NC

### 2NC – Overview

#### Our interpretation is that topical affirmatives must increase economic contacts across a variety of industrial sectors over a protracted period of time to change the behavior of the target state. They don’t meet because they’re an isolated event and are cultural engagement – that’s Haas and Resnick.

#### There are 3 DAs to their interpretation:

#### 1) Limits – they explode the topic by allowing single-sector affs, postal and telephone services, remittances, funding NGOs, and increasing any single visa. Allowing cultural engagement opens the floodgates for other types of engagement which triples the size.

#### AND, there are 155 NGOs in the topic countries which increases by an order of magnitude the number of topical affs

WANGO no date (World Association of Non-Governmental Organizations, last updated 2013, “Worldwide NGO Directory,” <http://www.wango.org/resources.aspx?section=ngodir>, alp)

\*This isn’t a card – going to that website takes you to a directory of all NGOs – you can use the sidebar to select countries and figure out the total number of NGOs in those countries. There are 107 in Mexico, 15 in Cuba, and 33 in Venezuela.

#### That makes the preparation burden impossible which causes a shift to hypergenerics and undermines research skills by disincentivizing case-specific research – that prevents topic clash which destroys topic education and critical thinking. A decrease in specificity skews cost-benefit analysis which turns and solves all their impacts – only portable skill. Only prepared negatives can rigorously test affirmatives from multiple perspectives – key to advocacy construction.

#### 2) Ground – they shift topic focus which prevents us from generating predictable and stable offense – diminishes the quality of debates which turns education.

#### 3) Definitional limits are key to making engagement policy effective – turns solvency

Resnick 1 – Dr. Evan Resnick, Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yeshiva University, “Defining Engagement”, Journal of International Affairs, Spring, 54(2), Ebsco

While the term "engagement" enjoys great consistency and clarity of meaning in the discourse of romantic love, it enjoys neither in the discourse of statecraft. Currently, practitioners and scholars of American foreign policy are vigorously debating the merits of engagement as a strategy for modifying the behavior of unsavory regimes. The quality of this debate, however, is diminished by the persistent inability of the US foreign policy establishment to advance a coherent and analytically rigorous conceptualization of engagement. In this essay, I begin with a brief survey of the conceptual fog that surrounds engagement and then attempt to give a more refined definition. I will use this definition as the basis for drawing a sharp distinction between engagement and alternative policy approaches, especially appeasement, isolation and containment. In the contemporary lexicon of United States foreign policy, few terms have been as frequently or as confusingly invoked as that of engagement.(n1) A growing consensus extols the virtues of engagement as the most promising policy for managing the threats posed to the US by foreign adversaries. In recent years, engagement constituted the Clinton administration's declared approach in the conduct of bilateral relations with such countries as China, Russia, North Korea and Vietnam. Robert Suettinger, a onetime member of the Clinton administration's National Security Council, remarked that the word engagement has "been overused and poorly defined by a variety of policymakers and speechwriters" and has "become shopworn to the point that there is little agreement on what it actually means."(n2) The Clinton foreign policy team attributed five distinct meanings to engagement:(n3) A broad-based grand strategic orientation: In this sense, engagement is considered synonymous with American internationalism and global leadership. For example, in a 1993 speech, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake observed that American public opinion was divided into two rival camps: "On the one side is protectionism and limited foreign engagement; on the other is active American engagement abroad on behalf of democracy and expanded trade."(n4) A specific approach to managing bilateral relations with a target state through the unconditional provision of continuous concessions to that state: During the 1992 presidential campaign, candidate Bill Clinton criticized the Bush administration's "ill-advised and failed" policy of "constructive engagement" toward China as one that "coddled the dictators and pleaded for progress, but refused to impose penalties for intransigence."(n5) A bilateral policy characterized by the conditional provision of concessions to a target state: The Clinton administration announced in May 1993 that the future extension of Most Favored Nation trading status to China would be conditional on improvements in the Chinese government's domestic human rights record.(n6) Likewise, in the Agreed Framework signed by the US and North Korea in October 1994, the US agreed to provide North Korea with heavy oil, new light-water nuclear reactors and eventual diplomatic and economic normalization in exchange for a freeze in the North's nuclear weapons program.(n7) A bilateral policy characterized by the broadening of contacts in areas of mutual interest with a target state: Key to this notion of engagement is the idea that areas of dialogue and fruitful cooperation should be broadened and not be held hostage through linkage to areas of continuing disagreement and friction. The Clinton administration inaugurated such a policy toward China in May 1994 by declaring that it would not tie the annual MFN decision to the Chinese government's human rights record.(n8) Similarly, the administration's foreign policy toward the Russian Federation has largely been one of engagement and described as an effort to "build areas of agreement and...develop policies to manage our differences."(n9) A bilateral policy characterized by the provision of technical assistance to facilitate economic and political liberalization in a target state: In its 1999 national security report, the White House proclaimed that its "strategy of engagement with each of the NIS [Newly Independent States]" consisted of "working with grassroots organizations, independent media, and emerging entrepreneurs" to "improve electoral processes and help strengthen civil society," and to help the governments of the NIS to "build the laws, institutions and skills needed for a market democracy, to fight crime and corruption [and] to advance human rights and the rule of law."(n10) Unfortunately, scholars have not fared better than policymakers in the effort to conceptualize engagement because they often make at least one of the following critical errors: (1) treating engagement as a synonym for appeasement; (2) defining engagement so expansively that it essentially constitutes any policy relying on positive sanctions; (3) defining engagement in an unnecessarily restrictive manner.

#### 4) No offense – they still have reasonable aff ground: Cuban embargo, TPP, TTIP, investment in infrastructure, oil and refining, a variety of medical sectors. HP’s science diplomacy aff is topical, Lex’s NADbank aff is topical, Damien’s manufacturing aff is topical. They chose the aff with one contrived solvency advocate and you should punish them for that.

### 2NC – AT: We meet

#### You don’t meet – Haas indicates student transfer is cultural engagement. Haas explicitly writes to guide public policy and Resnick provides reasonable limits for the topic by clarifiying past misconceptions. Both are qualified PhDs.

#### Prefer the precision of our interp – their “we-meet” claims are contrived – proves no predictable limits.

### 2NC – AT: Reasonability

#### Prefer competing interpretations:

#### 1) Prevents a race to the fringes – you can always be reasonably topical – no brightline ensures topic explosion which links to the limits DA.

#### 2) Prevents judge interventions – inevitable to determine the unquantifiable extent of their interpretation’s effect on the topic.

#### 3) Precision outweighs – reasonability eviscerates topic education, prevents scholarly research, and turns solvency

Resnick 1 — Evan Resnick, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at Columbia University, holds an M.Phil. in Political Science and an M.A. in Political Science from Columbia University, 2001 (“Defining engagement,” *Journal of International Affairs*, Volume 54, Issue 2, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via ABI/INFORM Complete)

In matters of national security, establishing a clear definition of terms is a precondition for effective policymaking. Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an erratic, ad hoc fashion risk alienating their constituencies. They also risk exacerbating misperceptions and hostility among those the policies target. Scholars who commit the same error undercut their ability to conduct valuable empirical research. Hence, if scholars and policymakers fail rigorously to define "engagement," they undermine the ability to build an effective foreign policy.

### 2NC – STEM high

#### STEM education’s high now – if we win this argument, there’s no affirmative – existing workers solve tech leadership and STEM solves cybersecurity and IT:

#### a) Empirics – that’s Bruner – the US has won more Nobel prizes in the sciences than any other country – it’s consistent and increasing.

#### b) Their ev is hype – new EPI studies prove – IT industries are overstaffed

EPI 4/24 (Economic Policy Institute, April 24, 2013, “EPI analysis finds no shortage of STEM workers in the United States,” [http://www.epi.org/press/epi-analysis-finds-shortage-stem-workers/](http://www.epi.org/press/epi-analysis-finds-shortage-stem-workers/m), alp)

In a new EPI paper, Hal Salzman of Rutgers, Daniel Kuehn of American University and B. Lindsay Lowell of Georgetown University find little evidence to support expansion of high-skill guestworker programs as proposed in the immigration bill being debated in the Senate. Contrary to many industry claims, the study finds that U.S. colleges and universities provide an ample supply of highly qualified science, technology, engineering and math (STEM) graduates. In Guestworkers in the high-skill U.S. labor market, the authors examine the IT labor market, guestworker flows and the STEM pipeline, and conclude that the United States has more than a sufficient supply of STEM workers available. Key findings include: Guestworkers may be filling as many as half of all new IT jobs each year IT workers earn the same today as they did, generally, 14 years ago Currently, only one of every two STEM college graduates is hired into a STEM job each year. Policies that expand the supply of guestworkers will discourage U.S. students from going into STEM, and into IT in particular “The debate over guestworker programs is largely based on anecdotal evidence and testimonials from employers, rather than solid evidence,” said Salzman. “Our examination shows that the STEM shortage in the United States is largely overblown. Guestworker programs are in need of reform, but any changes should make sure that guestworkers are not lower-paid substitutes for domestic workers.” Despite a steady supply of U.S. STEM graduates, guestworkers make up a large and growing portion of the workforce, specifically in information technology occupations and industries. IT employers look to guestworker programs as a source of labor that is plentiful even at wages that appear to be too low to attract large numbers of the best and brightest domestic students.

#### c) Wages prove – they’d have risen if there really were STEM shortages

Charette 8/30 (Robert N., fellow with Cutter’s Business Technology Strategies, president of ITABHI Corporation, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Spectrum, August 30, 2013, “The STEM Crisis Is a Myth,” http://spectrum.ieee.org/at-work/education/the-stem-crisis-is-a-myth, alp)

Even in the computer and IT industry, the sector that employs the most STEM workers and is expected to grow the most over the next 5 to 10 years, not everyone who wants a job can find one. A recent study by the Economic Policy Institute (EPI), a liberal-leaning think tank in Washington, D.C., found that more than a third of recent computer science graduates aren’t working in their chosen major; of that group, almost a third say the reason is that there are no jobs available. Spot shortages for certain STEM specialists do crop up. For instance, the recent explosion in data analytics has sparked demand for data scientists in health care and retail. But the H-1B visa and similar immigrant hiring programs are meant to address such shortages. The problem is that students who are contemplating what field to specialize in can’t assume such shortages will still exist by the time they emerge from the educational pipeline. What’s perhaps most perplexing about the claim of a STEM worker shortage is that many studies have directly contradicted it, including reports from Duke University, the Rochester Institute of Technology, the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, and the Rand Corp. A 2004 Rand study, for example, stated that there was no evidence “that such shortages have existed at least since 1990, nor that they are on the horizon.” That report argued that the best indicator of a shortfall would be a widespread rise in salaries throughout the STEM community. But the price of labor has not risen, as you would expect it to do if STEM workers were scarce. In computing and IT, wages have generally been stagnant for the past decade, according to the EPI and other analyses. And over the past 30 years, according to the Georgetown report, engineers’ and engineering technicians’ wages have grown the least of all STEM wages and also more slowly than those in non-STEM fields; while STEM workers as a group have seen wages rise 33 percent and non-STEM workers’ wages rose by 23 percent, engineering salaries grew by just 18 percent. The situation is even more grim for those who get a Ph.D. in science, math, or engineering. The Georgetown study states it succinctly: “At the highest levels of educational attainment, STEM wages are not competitive.” Given all of the above, it is difficult to make a case that there has been, is, or will soon be a STEM labor shortage. “If there was really a STEM labor market crisis, you’d be seeing very different behaviors from companies,” notes Ron Hira, an associate professor of public policy at the Rochester Institute of Technology, in New York state. “You wouldn’t see companies cutting their retirement contributions, or hiring new workers and giving them worse benefits packages. Instead you would see signing bonuses, you’d see wage increases. You would see these companies really training their incumbent workers.” “None of those things are observable,” Hira says. “In fact, they’re operating in the opposite way.”

#### d) We indict every study in the 1AC – the NMS isn’t credible – they cite cherry-picked data and ignore fluctuations in labor markets

Charette 8/30 (Robert N., fellow with Cutter’s Business Technology Strategies, president of ITABHI Corporation, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Spectrum, August 30, 2013, “The STEM Crisis Is a Myth,” http://spectrum.ieee.org/at-work/education/the-stem-crisis-is-a-myth, alp)

You must have seen the warning a thousand times: Too few young people study scientific or technical subjects, businesses can’t find enough workers in those fields, and the country’s competitive edge is threatened. It pretty much doesn’t matter what country you’re talking about—the United States is facing this crisis, as is Japan, the United Kingdom, Australia, China, Brazil, South Africa, Singapore, India…the list goes on. In many of these countries, the predicted shortfall of STEM (short for science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) workers is supposed to number in the hundreds of thousands or even the millions. A 2012 report by President Obama’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, for instance, stated that over the next decade, 1 million additional STEM graduates will be needed. In the U.K., the Royal Academy of Engineering reported last year that the nation will have to graduate 100 000 STEM majors every year until 2020 just to stay even with demand. Germany, meanwhile, is said to have a shortage of about 210 000 workers in what’s known there as the MINT disciplines—mathematics, computer science, natural sciences, and technology. The situation is so dismal that governments everywhere are now pouring billions of dollars each year into myriad efforts designed to boost the ranks of STEM workers. President Obama has called for government and industry to train 10 000 new U.S. engineers every year as well as 100 000 additional STEM teachers by 2020. And until those new recruits enter the workforce, tech companies like Facebook, IBM, and Microsoft are lobbying to boost the number of H-1B visas—temporary immigration permits for skilled workers—from 65 000 per year to as many as 180 000. The European Union is similarly introducing the new Blue Card visa to bring in skilled workers from outside the EU. The government of India has said it needs to add 800 new universities, in part to avoid a shortfall of 1.6 million university-educated engineers by the end of the decade. And yet, alongside such dire projections, you’ll also find reports suggesting just the opposite—that there are more STEM workers than suitable jobs. One study found, for example, that wages for U.S. workers in computer and math fields have largely stagnated since 2000. Even as the Great Recession slowly recedes, STEM workers at every stage of the career pipeline, from freshly minted grads to mid- and late-career Ph.D.s, still struggle to find employment as many companies, including Boeing, IBM, and Symantec, continue to lay off thousands of STEM workers. To parse the simultaneous claims of both a shortage and a surplus of STEM workers, we’ll need to delve into the data behind the debate, how it got going more than a half century ago, and the societal, economic, and nationalistic biases that have perpetuated it. And what that dissection reveals is that there is indeed a STEM crisis—just not the one everyone’s been talking about. The real STEM crisis is one of literacy: the fact that today’s students are not receiving a solid grounding in science, math, and engineering. In preparing this article, I went through hundreds of reports, articles, and white papers from the past six decades. There were plenty of data, but there was also an extraordinary amount of inconsistency. Who exactly is a STEM worker: somebody with a bachelor’s degree or higher in a STEM discipline? Somebody whose job requires use of a STEM subject? What about someone who manages STEM workers? And which disciplines and industries fall under the STEM umbrella? Such definitions obviously affect the counts. For example, in the United States, both the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the Department of Commerce track the number of STEM jobs, but using different metrics. According to Commerce, 7.6 million individuals worked in STEM jobs in 2010, or about 5.5 percent of the U.S. workforce. That number includes professional and technical support occupations in the fields of computer science and mathematics, engineering, and life and physical sciences as well as management. The NSF, by contrast, counts 12.4 million science and engineering jobs in the United States, including a number of areas that the Commerce Department excludes, such as health-care workers (4.3 million) and psychologists and social scientists (518 000). Such inconsistencies don’t just create confusion for numbers junkies like me; they also make rational policy discussions difficult. Depending on your point of view, you can easily cherry-pick data to bolster your argument. Another surprise was the apparent mismatch between earning a STEM degree and having a STEM job. Of the 7.6 million STEM workers counted by the Commerce Department, only 3.3 million possess STEM degrees. Viewed another way, about 15 million U.S. residents hold at least a bachelor’s degree in a STEM discipline, but three-fourths of them—11.4 million—work outside of STEM. The departure of STEM graduates to other fields starts early. In 2008, the NSF surveyed STEM graduates who’d earned bachelor’s and master’s degrees in 2006 and 2007. It found that 2 out of 10 were already working in non-STEM fields. And 10 years after receiving a STEM degree, 58 percent of STEM graduates had left the field, according to a 2011 study from Georgetown University. The takeaway? At least in the United States, you don’t need a STEM degree to get a STEM job, and if you do get a degree, you won’t necessarily work in that field after you graduate. If there is in fact a STEM worker shortage, wouldn’t you expect more people with STEM degrees to be filling those jobs? And if many STEM jobs can be filled by people who don’t have STEM degrees, then why the big push to get more students to pursue STEM? Now consider the projections that suggest a STEM worker shortfall. One of the most cited in recent U.S. debates comes from the 2011 Georgetown University report mentioned above, by Anthony P. Carnevale, Nicole Smith, and Michelle Melton of the Center on Education and the Workforce. It estimated there will be slightly more than 2.4 million STEM job openings in the United States between 2008 and 2018, with 1.1 million newly created jobs and the rest to replace workers who retire or move to non-STEM fields; they conclude that there will be roughly 277 000 STEM vacancies per year. But the Georgetown study did not fully account for the Great Recession. It projected a downturn in 2009 but then a steady increase in jobs beginning in 2010 and a return to normal by the year 2018. In fact, though, more than 370 000 science and engineering jobs in the United States were lost in 2011, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics. I don’t mean to single out this study for criticism; it just illustrates the difficulty of accurately predicting STEM demand and supply even a year or two out, let alone over a prolonged period. Highly competitive science- and technology-driven industries are volatile, where radical restructurings and boom-and-bust cycles have been the norm for decades. Many STEM jobs today are also targets for outsourcing or replacement by automation. The nature of STEM work has also changed dramatically in the past several decades. In engineering, for instance, your job is no longer linked to a company but to a funded project. Long-term employment with a single company has been replaced by a series of de facto temporary positions that can quickly end when a project ends or the market shifts. To be sure, engineers in the 1950s were sometimes laid off during recessions, but they expected to be hired back when the economy picked up. That rarely happens today. And unlike in decades past, employers seldom offer generous education and training benefits to engineers to keep them current, so out-of-work engineers find they quickly become technologically obsolete. Any of these factors can affect both short-term and longer-term demand for STEM workers, as well as for the particular skills those workers will need. The agencies that track science and engineering employment know this to be true. Buried in Chapter 3 of a 2012 NSF workforce study, for instance, you’ll find this caveat: “Projections of employment growth are plagued by uncertain assumptions and are notoriously difficult to make.” So is there a shortfall of STEM workers or isn’t there? The Georgetown study estimates that nearly two-thirds of the STEM job openings in the United States, or about 180 000 jobs per year, will require bachelor’s degrees. Now, if you apply the Commerce Department’s definition of STEM to the NSF’s annual count of science and engineering bachelor’s degrees, that means about 252 000 STEM graduates emerged in 2009. So even if all the STEM openings were entry-level positions and even if only new STEM bachelor’s holders could compete for them, that still leaves 70 000 graduates unable to get a job in their chosen field. Of course, the pool of U.S. STEM workers is much bigger than that: It includes new STEM master’s and Ph.D. graduates (in 2009, around 80 000 and 25 000, respectively), STEM associate degree graduates (about 40 000), H-1B visa holders (more than 50 000), other immigrants and visa holders with STEM degrees, technical certificate holders, and non-STEM degree recipients looking to find STEM-related work. And then there’s the vast number of STEM degree holders who graduated in previous years or decades. Even in the computer and IT industry, the sector that employs the most STEM workers and is expected to grow the most over the next 5 to 10 years, not everyone who wants a job can find one. A recent study by the Economic Policy Institute (EPI), a liberal-leaning think tank in Washington, D.C., found that more than a third of recent computer science graduates aren’t working in their chosen major; of that group, almost a third say the reason is that there are no jobs available.

### 2NC – AT: Cyberattacks

#### No impact to cyberattacks:

#### a) Empirics – no other countries executed massive cyberattacks – the worst one occurred in Brazil and killed no one – that’s Libicki.

#### Additionally:

#### 1) Their ev is fearmongering – prefer credible experts – no risk

Rid 3/13 (Thomas, fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations, fellow at the School for Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins, Reader at King’s College London’s Department of War Studies, PhD from Humboldt Universitat zu Berlin, Foreign Policy, March 13, 2013, “The Great Cyberscare,’ <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/13/the_great_cyberscare>, alp)

The White House likes a bit of threat. In his State of the Union address, Barack Obama wanted to nudge Congress yet again into passing meaningful legislation. The president emphasized that America's enemies are "seeking the ability to sabotage our power grid, our financial institutions, and our air traffic control systems." After two failed attempts to pass a cybersecurity act in the past two years, he added swiftly: "We cannot look back years from now and wonder why we did nothing in the face of real threats to our security and our economy." Fair enough. A bit of threat to prompt needed action is one thing. Fear-mongering is something else: counterproductive. Yet too many a participant in the cybersecurity debate reckons that puffery pays off. A reminder is in order: The world has yet to witness a single casualty, let alone fatality, as a result of a computer attack. Such statements are a plain insult to survivors of Hiroshima. Some sections of the Pentagon document offer such eye-wateringly shoddy analysis that they would not have passed as an MA dissertation in a self-respecting political science department. But in the current debate it seemed to make sense. After all a bit of fear helps to claim -- or keep -- scarce resources when austerity and cutting seems out-of-control. The report recommended allocating the stout sum of $2.5 billion for its top two priorities alone, protecting nuclear weapons against cyberattacks and determining the mix of weapons necessary to punish all-out cyber-aggressors. Which leads to the next point: The media wants to sell copies through threat inflation. "In Cyberspace, New Cold War," the headline writers at the Times intoned in late February. "The U.S. is not ready for a cyberwar," shrieked the Washington Post earlier this week. Instead of calling out the above-mentioned Pentagon report, the paper actually published two supportive articles on it and pointed out that a major offensive cyber capability now seemed essential "in a world awash in cyber-espionage, theft and disruption." The Post should have reminded its readers that the only military-style cyberattack that has actually created physical damage -- Stuxnet -- was actually executed by the United States government. The Times, likewise, should have asked tough questions and pointed to some of the evidential problems in the Mandiant report; instead, it published what appeared like an elegant press release for the firm. On issues of cybersecurity, the nation's fiercest watchdogs too often look like hand-tame puppies eager to lap up stories from private firms as well as anonymous sources in the security establishment. Finally, the intelligence community tags along with the hype because the NSA and CIA are still traumatized by missing 9/11. Missing a "cyber 9/11" would be truly catastrophic for America's spies, so erring on the side of caution seems the rational choice. Yes, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper's recent testimony was more nuanced than reported and toned down the threat of a very serious cyberattack. But at the same time America's top spies are not as forthcoming with more detailed information as they could be. We know that the intelligence community, especially in the United States, has far better information, better sources, better expertise, and better analysts than private companies like Symantec, McAfee, and Kaspersky Lab. But for a number of reasons they keep their findings and their analysis classified. This means that the quality of the public debate suffers, as experts as well as journalists have no choice but to rely on industry reports of sometimes questionable quality or anonymous informants whose veracity is hard to assess.

#### 2) Cloud computing solves

Rashid 11 (Fahmida Y., 17 May 2011, DoD's DARPA Plans Resilient Cloud to Withstand Cyber-Attacks, <http://mobile.eweek.com/c/a/Security/DoDs-DARPA-Plans-Resilient-Cloud-to-Withstand-CyberAttacks-826868/>, RBatra)

The DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) will build a cloud-based network that can continue supporting military missions even while under cyber-attack, DARPA said in an announcement May 17. DARPA will elaborate on the details behind the MRC (Mission-oriented Resilient Clouds) project at a Proposer's Day meeting on May 26. Considering the mission-critical and sensitive nature of the Defense Department's projects, the department requires a secure cloud infrastructure that can withstand a cyber-attack without interruption. The problem lies with the cloud's inability to withstand an attack, DARPA said. There is a high degree of trust between hosts within a cloud infrastructure, which allows malware to spread rapidly to other systems within the environment once it manages to get in. Since the hosts are also integrated using high-speed connections, attacks can potentially propagate even more rapidly than in conventional networked systems, according to DARPA. "Today's hosts, of course, are highly vulnerable, but even if the hosts within a cloud are reasonably secure, any residual vulnerability in the hosts will be amplified dramatically," DARPA said. The MRC program will run an "ensemble of interconnected hosts acting in concert," DARPA said in the announcement. "Loss of individual hosts and tasks within the ensemble is allowable as long as mission effectiveness is preserved," DARPA said. The MRC project will include redundant hosts and will be able to correlate attack information while switching around resources. "The goal is to provide resilient support to the mission through adaptation," according to the agency. The country's military weapons systems and other critical communications systems are controlled and operated through computers and computer networks, Peter Pace, a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said at a conference on cyberspace in April. It is critical that the United States be able to detect when the network is under attack and to be able to defend it without compromising the systems that rely on the network, according to Pace. Department of Defense systems are under continuous attack. Over 250,000 probes hit DoD networks every hour, Gen. Keith Alexander, the director the National Security Agency and commander of the U.S. Cyber Command, said at a conference last year. The research project will support the federal government's "cloud first" policy as announced by Vivek Kundra, United States CIO, back in December. The policy requires every federal agency to identify three existing systems that could move to the cloud, and to consider a cloud system when developing new projects. "Cloud computing is a rapidly emerging trend within both the commercial sector and the Department of Defense," DARPA said. The MRC project would help move the DoD toward more cloud computing initiatives, according to Dave Mihelcic, the CTO of the Defense Information Systems Agency, in the announcement. MRC will be a companion program to the existing Clean-slate design of Resilient, Adaptive, Secure Hosts (CRASH) project that aims to limit vulnerabilities in each host within a cloud infrastructure. MRC will focus on the network's "amplifying" effect and use it to make the network more resilient, instead of helping to propagate the attack.

#### 3) Air gapping solves – the risk is 1%

Walsh 11 (Ryan, works for Office of Global Security at Goldman Sachs, has worked with Office of Counterterrorism, NY State Department of Homeland Security, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Full Court Peace, and Good Harbor Consulting, “Cyberterrorism Trend Analysis” Perspectives on Global Issues February 15 http://www.perspectivesonglobalissues.com/current/cyberterrorism-trend-analysis/)

Mitigating Factors Experts estimate that hackers may number 19 million worldwide, who are responsible for tens of thousands of attacks each day in the US alone. Why, then, has no significant cyberterror threat emerged? The virtual non-existence of cyberterror can be attributed to a few key factors. First, although there are a large number of hackers and cyberattacks worldwide, most attacks are low-level and are conducted by hackers who lack technical expertise. In fact, the IBM Global Security Analysis Lab reported that just 1% of hackers worldwide are advanced enough to successfully conduct a significant attack; and these attacks are generally non-disruptive. Second, significant barriers prevent the acquisition of resources to enable the capability to execute a cyberterror attack. To illustrate this point, a 2002 war-game conducted by the United States Naval War College found that, according to CNET, “it would be possible to inflict some serious damage to the nation’s data and physical infrastructure systems, but it would require a syndicate with significant resources, including $200 million, country-level intelligence and five years of preparation time.” Terrorists do not likely have the technical capability or financial resources to carry out a significant attack. Third, an attack on US infrastructure would not be as catastrophic as imagined. Despite a reliance on vulnerable, interconnected infrastructure networks, some of the most important targets (e.g., the New York Stock Exchange, military, and nuclear sites) are “air gapped.” In other words, these networks are secure from outside intrusion, because they are not connected to the open internet. Skeptics of cyberterror argue that an attack on infrastructure would not be a vital threat to national security. After all, the skeptics contend, infrastructure failures (in the form of power outages) have already occurred with no catastrophic disaster as a result. Fourth, terrorists may simply not have an interest in conducting cyberterror attacks. Cyberterror attacks generally involve less immediate panic and drama than physical terrorist tactics. A victim may not even be aware they are under cyberattack until well after the intrusion, making it difficult for a terrorist to connect the attack to a specific ideology. Ultimately, this disinterest decreases the immediate, psychological effects of an attack that terrorists likely seek. Terrorist tactics that involve quick, physically violent strikes tend to succeed. As such, there is no inherent need for terrorists to innovate (See Appendix C).

### 2NC – AT: Hegemony (empirics)

#### Empirics prove no impact to heg decline – that’s Fettweis:

#### a) Sequestration triggered their perception and drawback links but countries cut military spending – disproves adventurism.

#### b) Afghanistan and Iraq caused overstretch and tanked credibility – international backlash made achieving goals harder – proves we’ll use heg wrong if we have it.

#### c) No brink – 2008 recession proves either they’re wrong or the timeframe is massive.

#### Anglo-American transition proves

Parent 11—Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami—AND—Paul K. MacDonald, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College (Joseph M., Spring 2011, International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4, http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC\_a\_00034, RBatra)

Some observers might dispute our conclusions, arguing that hegemonic transitions are more conflict prone than other moments of acute relative decline. We counter that there are deductive and empirical reasons to doubt this argument. Theoretically, hegemonic powers should actually find it easier to manage acute relative decline. Fallen hegemons still have formidable capability, which threatens grave harm to any state that tries to cross them. Further, they are no longer the top target for balancing coalitions, and recovering hegemons may be influential because they can play a pivotal role in alliance formation. In addition, hegemonic powers, almost by definition, possess more extensive overseas commitments; they should be able to more readily identify and eliminate extraneous burdens without exposing vulnerabilities or exciting domestic populations. We believe the empirical record supports these conclusions. In particular, **periods of hegemonic transition do not appear more conflict prone** than those of acute decline. The last reversal at the pinnacle of power was the Anglo-American transition, which took place around 1872 and was resolved without armed confrontation. The tenor of that transition may have been influenced by a number of factors: both states were democratic maritime empires, the United States was slowly emerging from the Civil War, and Great Britain could likely coast on a large lead in domestic capital stock. Although China and the United States differ in regime type, similar factors may work to cushion the impending Sino-American transition. Both are large, relatively secure continental great powers, a fact that mitigates potential geopolitical competition.93 China faces a variety of domestic political challenges, including strains among rival regions, which may complicate its ability to sustain its economic performance or engage in foreign policy adventurism.94 Most important, the United States is not in free fall. Extrapolating the data into the future, we anticipate the United States will experience a “moderate” decline, losing from 2 to 4 percent of its share of great power GDP in the five years after being surpassed by China sometime in the next decade or two.95 Given the relatively gradual rate of U.S. decline relative to China, the incentives for either side to run risks by courting conflict are minimal. The United States would still possess upwards of a third of the share of great power GDP, and would have little to gain from provoking a crisis over a peripheral issue. Conversely, China has few incentives to exploit U.S. weakness.96 Given the importance of the U.S. market to the Chinese economy, in addition to the critical role played by the dollar as a global reserve currency, it is unclear how Beijing could hope to consolidate or expand its increasingly advantageous position through direct confrontation.

### 2NC – AT: Hegemony (i/l)

#### They don’t affect hegemony’s structural checks on war – that’s Maher:

#### a) Basing in Europe and Asia solves power projection– no drawdowns because of WW2 treaties.

#### b) Global institutions solve diplomacy which checks conflict and locks in stability for great powers who benefit from interdependence. Countries want strong relations with the US for protection.

#### c) Power disparity is sufficient – nuclear and naval deterrence solve escalation OR other countries are already ahead which means collapse is inevitable.

#### We’ll manage the transition which solves their impacts

Yi 9 [Xiaoxiong, professor of political science and director of the China Program at Marietta College, “American leadership in a non-polar world,” 12/30/09 http://www.zanesvilletimesrecorder.com/article/20091230/OPINION02/912300303]

In the coming "non-polar" world, no single power will run the show, nor will there be a group of powers such as China, India and Brazil as more or less "equal" powers with the United States, Japan and EU, managing the world system. Instead, the principal characteristic of non-polarity is that the world will be "influenced by dozens of state and non-state actors exercising various kinds of power," according to Richard Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations. The emergence of a non-polar world can prove to be messy, complex and mostly negative. For one thing, as Haass points out, "more decision-makers make it more difficult to make decisions." The recent failure of world leaders to achieve a tough and binding greenhouse-gas reduction agreement in Copenhagen has brought into sharp focus a crisis of non-polarity. For another, without a uni-polar power center or a clearly defined multi-polar power structure, many of the most dangerous challenges we are facing today -- the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs, the Arab-Israeli conflict, the genocide in Sudan and the surge in piracy off Somalia-will be hard to defuse or even contain. The consequences of the non-polarity may be dangerously destabilizing, but it is a mistake to conclude that a "growing vacuum of power" will inevitably lead to more conflict. Even in this emerging non-polar world, the United States remains to be the last guarantor of international security and global financial stability. There is simply no other alternative. In the coming decade, we can expect that power will continue to be diffused rather than concentrated in the world. But, as Richard Haass noticed, "This is not all bad news for the United States: the United States still retains more capacity than any other actor to improve the quality of the international system and Washington can still manage the transition and make the world a safer place." The challenge for the United States, however, is to understand the limits of America's reach and to embed America's hard power in a new form of "soft power" leadership. President Obama seems to have come to grasp with the essence of this emerging new world order -- that was perhaps why he was able to pull off what was possibly the only sensible deal in Copenhagen by working in tandem with the Chinese, Brazilian, Indian and South African leaders.

### 2NC – AT: Hegemony (lashout)

#### No lashout and it’ll be small-scale – Afghanistan and Iraq prove. Disarmament treaties solve nuclear first use and counterbalancing, diplomacy, and intervening actors check escalation – empirics prove – that’s Parent.

### 1NC – AT: Economy (resilient)

#### Crisis won’t cause war

Barnett 9—senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC (Thomas, The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis, 25 August 2009, http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx, AMiles)

When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how globalization's first truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security landscape. None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the global recession. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions. Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global economic trends. And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn, occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces. So, to sum up: •No significant uptick in mass violence or unrest (remember the smattering of urban riots last year in places like Greece, Moldova and Latvia?); •The usual frequency maintained in civil conflicts (in all the usual places); •Not a single state-on-state war directly caused (and no great-power-on-great-power crises even triggered); •No great improvement or disruption in great-power cooperation regarding the emergence of new nuclear powers (despite all that diplomacy); •A modest scaling back of international policing efforts by the system's acknowledged Leviathan power (inevitable given the strain); and •No serious efforts by any rising great power to challenge that Leviathan or supplant its role. (The worst things we can cite are Moscow's occasional deployments of strategic assets to the Western hemisphere and its weak efforts to outbid the United States on basing rights in Kyrgyzstan; but the best include China and India stepping up their aid and investments in Afghanistan and Iraq.) Sure, we've finally seen global defense spending surpass the previous world record set in the late 1980s, but even that's likely to wane given the stress on public budgets created by all this unprecedented "stimulus" spending. If anything, the friendly cooperation on such stimulus packaging was the most notable great-power dynamic caused by the crisis. Can we say that the world has suffered a distinct shift to political radicalism as a result of the economic crisis? Indeed, no. The world's major economies remain governed by center-left or center-right political factions that remain decidedly friendly to both markets and trade. In the short run, there were attempts across the board to insulate economies from immediate damage (in effect, as much protectionism as allowed under current trade rules), but there was no great slide into "trade wars." Instead, the World Trade Organization is functioning as it was designed to function, and regional efforts toward free-trade agreements have not slowed. Can we say Islamic radicalism was inflamed by the economic crisis? If it was, that shift was clearly overwhelmed by the Islamic world's growing disenchantment with the brutality displayed by violent extremist groups such as al-Qaida. And looking forward, austere economic times are just as likely to breed connecting evangelicalism as disconnecting fundamentalism. At the end of the day, the economic crisis did not prove to be sufficiently frightening to provoke major economies into establishing global regulatory schemes, even as it has sparked a spirited -- and much needed, as I argued last week -- discussion of the continuing viability of the U.S. dollar as the world's primary reserve currency. Naturally, plenty of experts and pundits have attached great significance to this debate, seeing in it the beginning of "economic warfare" and the like between "fading" America and "rising" China. And yet, in a world of globally integrated production chains and interconnected financial markets, such "diverging interests" hardly constitute signposts for wars up ahead. Frankly, I don't welcome a world in which America's fiscal profligacy goes undisciplined, so bring it on -- please! Add it all up and it's fair to say that this global financial crisis has proven the great resilience of America's post-World War II international liberal trade order.

### DA – Shunning

#### Dropped, conceded the d-rule, I know it’s a stupid argument, but really

# 1NR

### O/V—Generic

**Our impact takes the aff out—nuclear war would destroy the plan—durable fiat doesn’t solve since a war would reverse outward engagement on other areas as we divert resources – that’s elwood and panchineski**

**The disad turns the case, but not vice versa – the 1nc impacts precede theirs because we have a disad to the process** **of the plan being implemented in the first place**

**Trade solves the case**

**Dreier 11** – (David Dreier, 1/5/11, Politico, “Bipartisanship can revive economy,” http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0111/47044.html, JMP)

There are no higher priorities for our country right now than job creation and economic growth.

As the new Congress begins, every decision we make must be tied directly to those goals. If we are going to get our economy back on track, we need to take several key steps. These include making the current tax rates permanent, repealing the job-killing health care law and dramatically reducing federal spending.

Some of these efforts will divide Congress politically. But they are all a part of what House Republicans pledged we would do — and of what the American people expect us to do.

At the same time, there are areas in which both parties can work together. A strong trade agenda presents a unique opportunity to promote economic growth, **global partnerships** and bipartisan cooperation.

Unfortunately, the trade agenda has been allowed to languish for the past four years and, in some cases, has been thwarted. In the meantime, our economy and our global prestige have suffered. There’s never been a more important time to re-engage on trade.

Trade is often blamed for every manner of society’s ills. Globally connected commerce has been accused of having a hand in everything from terrorism to pandemics. In December, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez blamed it for the tragic mudslides that claimed dozens of lives in his nation and in Colombia.

Setting aside the disservice that such a claim does for addressing the true root causes of the great challenges we face, the reality of the role of trade is **precisely the opposite** of what this viewpoint presents. International trade plays an important part in improving a nation’s circumstances — far beyond the immediate scope of exports and imports.

Given the current climate, **the direct economic impact is the most urgent.** Opening up new markets for U.S. producers, farmers, service providers and investors is essential for spurring growth and creating new job opportunities for both union and nonunion workers here at home. The three markets with which we have pending free-trade agreements — Colombia, Panama and South Korea — represent 96 million consumers and $1.8 trillion in economic activity. **The opportunity for U.S. job creators is enormous**, so the delay in the agreements’ consideration is unjustifiable.

The benefits of trade, however, extend considerably beyond job creation and economic growth. Economic engagement across borders builds the **strong global partnerships** that are necessary to address the challenges of the 21st century. Whether the issue is tariffs or **nuclear proliferation,** the trust and spirit of collaboration forged through economic ties help the United States advance its interests and spread its values **around the globe.**

Enhancing prosperity through international trade also creates the resources necessary for **essential efforts like improving environmental quality, protecting human rights and building democratic institutions.** Raising living standards, in fact, helps alleviate many of society’s ills, including terrorism, pandemics and, yes, even the ability to respond to natural disasters in South America.

#### TPA is key to econ and heg

Oberhelman, 12/30 --- chairman and CEO of Caterpillar in Illinois and chairman of Business Roundtable’s International Engagement Committee (Doug, 12/30/2013, “Guest: Should Congress give Obama fast-track authority for trade deals? Yes,” <http://seattletimes.com/html/opinion/2022546185_dougoberhelmanprotradeoped30xml.html)>

LIKE most Americans, I’m frustrated with the slow rate of economic growth in the United States over the last several years.

Most proposals to fix the problem focus on domestic issues — government spending, taxes and infrastructure projects, to name a few.

As the chairman and chief executive officer of Caterpillar, I particularly like to talk about the need to invest in our nation’s infrastructure, which helps to make America more competitive in the world economy.

But while all of these issues are critically important to the U.S. economy, the opportunity to increase U.S. investment, growth and jobs requires us to go beyond America’s border.

Ninety-six percent of the world’s consumers live outside of the United States. In fact, in the last five years, Caterpillar has exported more than $82 billion in products manufactured at our factories in the United States, supporting tens of thousands of jobs. Creating opportunities for American companies to reach these consumers through new and expanded free-trade agreements can help to get our economy back on track and keep our nation globally competitive.

Today, trade supports more than one in five American jobs. U.S. exports have grown more than twice as fast as GDP since 2002, accounting for 14 percent of GDP in 2012. And workers in U.S. companies that export goods earn on average up to 18 percent more than those in similar jobs in non-exporting companies.

The United States is currently pursuing one of the most ambitious trade agendas in a generation, trade agreements that would open markets in the Asia-Pacific region and in Europe.

Also being negotiated is an agreement aimed at knocking down barriers to boost the global competitiveness of U.S. services companies. But to realize the economic benefits of these pending trade deals, Congress must update and pass Trade Promotion Authority legislation.

A partnership between Congress and the Administration, TPA legislation helps shape a strategic vision for U.S. trade policy and the goals the United States wants to accomplish in trade negotiations.

It provides a framework for Congress and the president to work together to craft that vision, and it helps define the critical constitutional relationship between Congress and the president with respect to foreign commerce.

From the 1930s until 2007, Congress has authorized every president to pursue trade agreements that open markets for U.S. goods and services. Such authority was last passed by Congress in 2002 and expired in 2007.

Updated TPA legislation would provide clear guidance on Congress’ requirements for trade agreements. It would also provide our trade negotiating partners with a degree of comfort that the United States is committed to the international trade negotiating process and the trade agreements we negotiate.

In the coming weeks it is expected that Congress will introduce updated TPA legislation. Congress should seize the opportunity to shore up the benefits of current and future trade agreements — increased U.S. investment, growth and jobs — by passing updated TPA legislation.

Working with the president to do so would ensure that the United States continues to pursue trade agreements that not only would allow companies like Caterpillar to remain globally competitive, but also would benefit America.

#### Trade promotion authority critical to completing TPP negotiations

Sracic, 12/16 --- professor and chairman of the political science department and Rigelhaupt Pre-Law Center at Youngstown State University in Ohio (Paul, 12/16/2013, “ Obama’s Trade Deal With Asia: Not So Fast,” <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-12-16/obama-s-trade-deal-with-asia-not-so-fast.html>))

The free-trade agreement being negotiated by the U.S. and 11 other nations is considered the economic keystone of the Barack Obama administration’s much-vaunted “pivot” to Asia. If successful, the Trans-Pacific Partnership will liberalize a $2 trillion market, reinforce U.S. standing as the lead promoter of “21st century” trade practices, and revolutionize economic relations between the U.S. and its most important ally in the region, Japan.

Given the complexities of negotiations involving economies ranging from Vietnam to Japan, the failure of recent meetings in Singapore to produce the promised year-end agreement isn’t a surprise. Yet the real question surrounding the TPP isn’t what will happen during the next talks in January. It is what will take place in the U.S. Congress, where the agreement threatens to get snarled in a partisan battle that taps foundational differences between Democrats and Republicans on the relationship between government and labor.

U.S. participation in a final TPP agreement will only happen if President Obama is able to get Trade Promotion (or fast-track) Authority from Congress. Since its creation in the Trade Act of 1974, this authority -- which guarantees that legislation implementing trade agreements won’t be amended on the floor of either house and, after limited debate, will receive an up or down vote -– has been part of every U.S. free-trade agreement.

Such authority will be crucial to reaching a final accord among the TPP nations themselves. Why, after all, would a U.S. partner present its “final, best offer” without some assurance that a counteroffer by the U.S. wouldn’t be amended later by Congress?

#### Solves china cyber and space belligerance

Nikkei Weekly, 12 (“For security's sake, look at TPP from global angle,” 9/3/2012, Factiva)

In the meantime, talks among current participants will move ahead. If Japan does not have a seat at the table early on, the pact's framework will be determined by the existing group along with Canada and Mexico, which are to join the talks by the end of the year.

In today's increasingly globalized economy, countries rely on each other more than ever. Security cannot be guaranteed by military power alone. So it is critical to create a market in which countries can compete fairly with China, whose trade strategy is governed by self-interest. The TPP will be an effective means of encouraging China to play by internationally accepted rules.

Now is the time for Noda and his Democratic Party of Japan to evaluate the TPP based on a global perspective, rather than simply its domestic political implications.

Lbl

All cards are eiterh about cir or climate – both not relevant

### 2NC UQ Wall

Not rel

#### Will pass early this year --- but only if Obama is actively involved and prioritizes it. That’s Schneider

#### 2 Filters for evidence—reject aff UQ that doesn’t assume

#### 1) PC which overcomes uniqueness shortfalls and proves that the link determines direction of DA

**2) Recent momentum and deal-making**

**Chicago Business 1/2** (Fight builds to give Obama fast-track trade authority January 02, 2014 <http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20140102/BLOGS02/140109985>, nkj)

Big Illinois exporters could get a vote very early this new year on something they've wanted for a long time: fast-track authority for President Barack Obama to negotiate new international trade deals. But the issue in the House now is "very close."

So says North Side congressman Mike Quigley, who unlike many Democratic House members says action is needed despite concerns from labor and some other groups.

Like it or not, "this is a global economy," said Mr. Quigley in an interview earlier this week. "If you're not at the bargaining table, if you don't get an agreement, someone else does," he said, referring specifically to China, which has been building ties rapidly with some of America's traditionally strong trading partners in Asia. "You'll be left in the dust."

Many top Illinois businesses already are lobbying to extend Trade Promotion Authority, as fast-track formally is known.

"From the 1930s until 2007, Congress has authorized every president to pursue trade agreements that open markets for U.S. goods and services," Caterpillar Inc. Chairman and CEO Doug Oberhelman wrote in a recent guest editorial.

"Today, trade supports more than one in five American jobs. U.S. exports have grown more than twice as fast as GDP since 2002, accounting for 14 percent of GDP in 2012. And workers in U.S. companies that export goods earn on average up to 18 percent more than those in similar jobs in non-exporting companies," he added. "Updated TPA legislation would provide clear guidance on Congress' requirements for trade agreements. It would also provide our trade negotiating partners with a degree of comfort that the United States is committed to the international trade negotiating process and the trade agreements we negotiate."

But Democrats in particular have been leery to renew the authority because of concerns that workers elsewhere are underpaid, putting Americans at a disadvantage. Many environmental groups express similar concerns stemming from low standards abroad. Even some Republicans are withholding support in highly partisan Washington.

But given international realities, the solution is not to ignore what competing countries are doing but "get the best deal possible" at the table for both labor and the environment. "It's tough being in the middle in this Congress . . . (But) this is important for Chicago and Illinois. We can't live in isolation."

Though the Obama White House has not signaled action, Mr. Quigley says he expects fast-track legislation to hit the House floor in January. And another Chicagoan, former U.S. Commerce Secretary Bill Daley, says some momentum indeed has begun to build on behalf of the measure.

"I think they have a compromise," Mr. Daley said. "Until the bill is on the floor, you never know for sure. But right now, they're talking as if they have a deal."

If so, a long-pending proposed Asian trade deal could follow shortly thereafter. Look for Penny Pritzker, commerce secretary from Chicago, to play a role too.

Meanwhile, Mr. Quigley says he's looking forward to playing an expanded role as a member of the House Appropriations Committee.

That panel has been pretty much bypassed in the past couple of years as talks amid the top congressional leaders settled budget questions -- in one case after the government temporarily shut down. But with a new two-year budget deal recently approved and some additional funds available for domestic spending, "I think we could get back to the regular order," Mr. Quigley said.

That could be a good thing for Chicago-area transit. Mr. Quigley is the third-ranking Democrat on the subcommittee that deals with housing and transit spending and, given rapid turnover in Congress, could be the top Democrat on that panel in two or three years.

#### Prefer evidence that cites aides

Mauldin, 12/16 (William, 12/16/2013, “Obama Huddles With Trade Team,” <http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2013/12/16/obama-huddles-with-trade-team/)>)

President Obama convened 17 of his top advisers, including his liaisons to Capitol Hill, Monday to discuss trade policy, a sign the White House is focusing more attention on wrapping up talks to form a Pacific trade bloc and pushing through legislation to ease the passage of trade agreements.

U.S. officials failed to achieve a year-end goal of wrapping up talks to form the Trans-Pacific Partnership with 11 other Asia-Pacific nations, but they’re hoping to negotiate an agreement next year. Meanwhile, to smooth the passage of the potential deal and other agreements in Congress, the administration is backing the renewal of legislation known as “fast track” or “trade promotion authority.”

“This remains a top priority of the president because of the positive economic benefits that come from it,” White House spokesman Jay Carney told reporters Monday.

Supporters of free-trade deals, including many Republicans, have said Mr. Obama hasn’t done enough personally to promote fast-track legislation in Congress, leaving U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman and other officials to sell the administration’s trade policy.

“Ambassador Froman – we have a great relationship with him; he’s very, very good. But you know he can’t do it all on his own,” Rep. Devin Nunes (R., Calif.), the leader of a House trade subcommittee, said in an interview last week.

Business leaders also said Mr. Obama’s absence from a gathering of Asia-Pacific leaders during the government shutdown may have hindered progress there in October.

Monday’s meeting included Vice President Joe Biden, Mr. Froman and several cabinet secretaries, along with senior advisers to Mr. Obama, the administration’s economic experts and officials who handle communications and legislative affairs.

“To call a meeting of this cast of characters to talk about the trade agenda is a positive signal that the president and his team are ready to make the case,” said Michael Smart, a former trade adviser on the National Security Council and consultant at Rock Creek Global Advisors LLC.

Mr. Biden recently met top officials in Japan, the second-biggest economy in the trade talks, as well as officials in Korea, which has expressed interest in joining the trade framework. Mr. Froman held recent meetings in Japan and negotiations among the 12 countries involved in Singapore, another country engaged in the talks.

Basic issues on tariffs and access to overseas markets appeared to be holding up a deal this year, according to experts following the talks, with the most attention focused on Japan’s politically sensitive agricultural and car markets.

In Congress, aides in recent days said top negotiators have reached a deal on renewing fast-track authority, which sets the ground rules for how the administration gets congressional approval for trade agreements, only allowing lawmakers an up-or-down vote at the end.

A Republican congressional aide said the public announcement of the meeting shows the Obama administration wants to send a message out more broadly that it’s working to achieve trade policy goals.

#### Bipartisanship proves

Fatheree, 12/28 --- senior director for Japan and Korea at the business lobby and president of the U.S.-Japan Business Council (James, Nikkei Report, Interviewed by Nikkei Washington bureau chief Akio Fujii, “No exceptions in TPP, but phaseouts OK: US Chamber official,” 12/28/2013, Factiva))

Q: How do you see the chances of Congress approving trade promotion authority (so-called fast-track powers for the president to negotiate trade deals for an up-or-down vote)?

A: You know, it's frequently noted, and we at the Chamber talk about this all the time, trade has been one area where there has been bipartisan agreement.

Q: So your expectation is that a TPA bill will be introduced in early January?

A: Yes. Certainly, if there were a TPP agreement, then (Congress) would move very quickly to approve TPA.

#### Top issue

House, 12/16 (Billy, 12/16/2013, NJ Daily Extra, “'Fast Track' Fight Could Dim Obama Hopes on Trade,” Factiva))

A White House push for congressional approval of “fast track” trade promotion authority is emerging as a key early test next year of President Obama’s already-battered second-term clout on Capitol Hill, with a main obstacle being the majority of his fellow Democrats in the House.

Opposition to such authority exists on the right, too, making it likely that Obama will have to cobble together a coalition of centrist Democrats and pro-business Republicans for passage of legislation giving the president greater autonomy in negotiating trade agreements.

“It’s going to take a fair amount of effort on the president’s part to get it through—a significant amount of arm-twisting with Democrats. That’s his challenge,” said Gary Hufbauer, a trade expert at the Peterson Institute for International Economics.

“A lot may depend on how energetically President Obama personally weighs in,” Hufbauer added.

How much of his existing political capital the president will have to expend—or will want to expend—in getting such action through Congress is uncertain coming off the troubled rollout of the health care law and the revolts against his interim deal on Iran and sanctions relief. Obama has said he needs the trade authority, but not nearly as forcefully as he’s talked about immigration reform.

International trade deals must be approved by Congress. But under fast-track authority, lawmakers would only be able to hold up-or-down votes on pacts presented by the administration and would not be able to tinker with the specifics of the deals through amendments or other changes. Such authority is typically seen as essential to ensuring other countries that the terms of an agreement they have reached cannot be renegotiated by Congress.

There had been hope within the Obama administration, and among some in Congress, that action on trade-promotion authority legislation would occur before the House and Senate adjourned for the year. The administration is now negotiating separate trade agreements with Pacific Rim and European Union nations.

But efforts to bring such legislation to the House floor this month never materialized, prompting speculation that they were quashed by Speaker John Boehner, though that is flatly denied by senior House GOP aides. Instead, the aides say House floor action this year had never been the aim of either Boehner or House Ways and Means Chairman Dave Camp, R-Mich.

While Camp, and Senate Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus, D‑Mont., and ranking member Orrin Hatch, R-Utah, had agreed on trade “policy,” the aides said, the bill on trade-promotion authority has not been completed.

But Boehner and Camp are in agreement about pressing ahead in January, the aides added. “We expect a bipartisan, bicameral TPA bill to be introduced when Congress returns. It is one of the first items on the chairman’s agenda,” Ways and Means spokeswoman Sarah Swinehart said.

“Senator Baucus has been ready to go for a while, but wants to do so in a bipartisan manner. That is the best way to ensure passage of legislation,” Finance spokesman Sean Neary said, adding that the intent is to introduce a bill in early January.

Camp also has been among those saying the administration’s “active participation” will be needed to gain bipartisan approval of trade-promotion authority. But the congressional opposition is bipartisan as well. More than 150 House Democrats led by Rosa DeLauro of Connecticut and George Miller of California have signed letters stating their opposition to Congress giving up its say on the terms of trade agreements.

### AT: Thumpers --- All

**Not rel**

**1) Issue specific uniqueness assumes thumpers—Obama has a calculated strategy where he has sufficient PC to pass the thumpers and \_\_\_--the plan destroys that strategy**

#### 2) Current PC Solves—overcomes other existing distractions—that’s Schneider

**3) Link is too narrow—it’s a question of competing economic policies—their thumper doesn’t spill over the way the plan does—Obama will push the plan and TPA but not the thumper**

#### 4) Top of docket—current sequencing puts trade as the “first battle”—that’s Schneider—prefer his conclusiveness—more evidence [Also in PC Key Block]

Business Times Singapore, 12/17 (“Obama must make the case for freer trade,” 12/17/2013, Factiva))

The TPA bill, which is expected to be introduced in January, will face fierce opposition from Democratic legislators affiliated with the labour unions and environmentalist forces who warn that free trade accords such as the TPP encourage American companies to relocate operations to low-wage emerging economies that don't adhere to environmental standards. There will also be pushback from conservative Republican lawmakers with ties to the Tea Party movement who don't want to strengthen the power of President Barack

#### Trade is a top priority for Obama

AFP, 12/16 (Agence France Presse, 12/16/2013, “Obama highlights desire for vast Pacific trade deal,” Factiva))

The White House sent a strong signal Monday of its desire to create a huge Pacific free trade area, despite the slippage of its year-end deadline for the 12-nation project.

President Barack Obama gathered senior trade advisors in the Oval Office and invited news photographers to document the meeting, in the wake of the latest ministerial talks last week on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in Singapore.

"This remains a top priority of the president because of the positive economic benefits that come from it," White House spokesman Jay Carney said.

"Congress and the American public have high expectations for the TPP.

"The administration is determined to get the best deal possible, and we are pleased with the progress made towards achieving an ambitious, comprehensive, high-standard agreement."

Ministers gave up last week on meeting the year-end goal of concluding the TPP, but US Trade Representative Michael Froman, who was in Singapore, and in Obama's Oval Office consultations on Monday, said significant progress had been made.

#### Trade is most important --- Obama sees it as his new legacy issue

Stelzer, 12/15 --- business adviser and director of economic policy studies at the Hudson Institute (12/15/2013, Irwin, The Sunday Times, “Obama pins his legacy on trade, not healthcare,” Factiva))

"The action is in the regionals," the University of California's Kati Suominen tells the press. And whether that "action" reduces trade barriers will depend heavily on America, the world's biggest market — putting Obama at centre stage, with Congress waiting in the wings. The president dearly wants to make successful conclusions of these regional negotiations part of his legacy. He is convinced freer trade would spur American exports, accelerate economic growth and create jobs. His hope that Obamacare would be an enduring legacy is fading. Bringing free trade to the world might have to do as a lesser substitute.

### Link Wall

#### The plan destroys Obama--that's shear

**A) Focus tradeoff--causes congress to shift focus on economic issues when they want to focus on security**

**B) Kowtowing--Makes Obama look like he's appeasing cartels**

**C) Recency outweighs specificity--Even if they have specific link turns, only ours assumes current political climate**

#### D) No turns—even if there are perceived benefits, they aren’t PERCIEVED

Wilson 13 – Associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International. Center for Scholars (Christopher E., January, “A U.S.-Mexico Economic Alliance: Policy Options for a Competitive Region,” http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/new\_ideas\_us\_mexico\_relations.pdf)

At a time when Mexico is poised to experience robust economic growth, a manufacturing renaissance is underway in North America and bilateral trade is booming, the United States and Mexico have an important choice to make: sit back and reap the moderate and perhaps temporal benefits coming naturally from the evolving global context , or implement a robust agenda to improve the competitiveness of North America for the long term . Given that job creation and economic growth in both the United States and Mexico are at stake, t he choice should be simple, but a limited understanding about the magnitude, nature and depth of the U.S.-Mexico economic relationship among the public and many policymakers has made serious action to support regional exporters more politically divisive than it ought to be.

#### Non PC link--it causes border security fights which uniquely tanks immigration

Isacson, 11

Adam, Senior Associate @ WOLA, Washington Office on Latin America, Areas of Expertise: Regional and Military Security Policy, Arms Transfers, Civil-Military Relations, Colombia, International Drug Policy, Mexico, Peace Processes, U.S. Assistance, Adam Isacson is a key member of WOLA’s Regional Security Policy team. He is a leading expert on defense, civil-military relations, and U.S. security assistance to the Americas. He collaborates on Just the Facts—a constantly updated source of information and analysis of the United States’ often troubled relationship with Latin America’s militaries. He helped found Just the Facts in the early 1990s. Mr. Isacson has co-authored dozens of publications, including “Ready, Aim, Foreign Policy” and “Waiting for Change,” which examine the increasing role of the military in U.S. foreign policy. During the 2000s, Mr. Isacson focused on Colombia, the principal destination of U.S. aid to Latin America at the time. At the end of the decade, he published “Don’t Call It a Model,” a comprehensive look at the lessons to be learned from Plan Colombia. He has testified before Congress on international drug policy, Colombia’s conflict, U.S. military aid programs and human rights, and has organized several congressional delegations to the region. He is “among the few in Washington who genuinely affect how policy-makers in Congress and the administration shape their decisions and policy proposals,” says a congressional staffer who closely follows Latin America policy. He is known for his pithy commentary, shared online daily through regular contributions to Just the Facts and other blogs. Among Latin America analysts, he has been a leader in cutting-edge use of technology for transparency, instant analysis, and advocacy. Mr. Isacson joined WOLA in 2010 after fourteen years working on Latin American and Caribbean security issues with the Center for International Policy (CIP). Before WOLA and CIP, he worked for the Arias Foundation for Peace and Human Progress in San José, Costa Rica as a program assistant for demilitarization. 3/10, http://www.wola.org/commentary/president\_obama\_s\_upcoming\_trip\_to\_latin\_america

Though Latin Americans’ perceptions of the United States have improved since a low point during the Bush administration, our country is no longer the central player in the economic lives of most Latin American countries, either through trade or aid. As a result, it carries much less political weight. Though it is not his intention, President Obama’s trip will underscore that the era of unquestioned U.S. leadership has ended, as the President himself acknowledged at the 2009 Summit of the Americas, when he emphasized building an “equal partnership” with the region’s states. In this new reality, the White House has made an astute choice of countries to visit. Each carries great symbolic value. • In Brazil, President Obama’s discussions with President Dilma Rousseff will highlight the global power and influence of South America’s rapidly growing giant. It may also mark a notable improvement in the tone of U.S. relations with Rousseff’s government, which assumed power in January. • In both Brazil and Chile, President Obama will recognize the success of long, difficult transitions from military dictatorship to democracy. Both countries are still trying to uncover the truth about the mass human rights abuses committed before those transitions began, and to hold the worst abusers accountable. The President would do well to acknowledge these important efforts. • In El Salvador, the President will be commemorating a successful transition from all-out civil war to stable peace, with a democracy so healthy that, following its 2009 elections, it underwent a smooth transition of power to the opposition: the party of the former guerrilla insurgency. President Obama’s trip is also important for what it is not “about.” This is not a visit driven by U.S. threat perceptions. Except for where it touches discussions of public security and organized crime, drugs — and the U.S. “war” on them — are not on the agenda. Nor should we expect much discussion of terrorism, Iran or even Venezuela. The focus on opportunities instead of threats is very welcome. Not all of the messages will be positive, however. In a time of reduced power and deep budget cuts, President Obama will be arriving largely empty-handed. There is relatively little new economic aid to offer; much of what the Administration can propose is re-programming to meet priority needs, improved coordination, and technical assistance. These are important, but not a substitute for new assistance and new initiatives. Not only can we expect few offers of new economic aid, we can expect few commitments to spend substantial political capital. The administration, though supportive, is unlikely to make a major political commitment to help Latin America address what, according to opinion polls throughout the region, are its main concerns: public security, unemployment, weak institutions, and migration. While crime and violence will be mentioned in Brazil and El Salvador, the most President Obama is likely to offer is a commitment to maintain modest existing levels of assistance for police and judicial institution-building. On the economy and jobs, the President will visit Chile and Brazil, whose growth rates dwarf our own. In his visit to El Salvador, whose economy is only beginning to recover from the financial crisis that hit the United States, the President is likely to support targeted anti-poverty efforts, but no major new initiatives. Strengthening institutions requires supporting reformers both in government and civil society, including human rights defenders and leaders of unions and social movements — something on which the U.S. record is mixed. On migration — a third-rail political issue in today’s Washington — we can expect little. (El Salvador seeks a long-term resolution of the status of the two hundred thousand Salvadorans still here on a “temporary protected” basis, but no immediate solution is at hand.) We will hear words like “partnership” and “engagement” used quite heavily and repeatedly in the course of this trip. This is certainly the right tone to take. But those words have little meaning, though, if they don’t come with a commitment to expend resources — both political and financial — to help our “partners” address their own concerns, even if it occasionally displeases a domestic political constituency. True partners are also willing to admit when their policies are not working, rather than forge blindly ahead as we have done in Cuba, the drug war, our trade policy and elsewhere. Latin America no longer revolves around the U.S. “sun,” and our policy toward the region can no longer act as though it does. Let’s hope that the tone and content of the President’s visit reflect that.

#### Latin engagement drains PC –GOP backlash, empirics, and appeasement perception

Padgett, 10

(Tim, Latin America Bureau Chief @ Time Magazine last 14 years, 8/23, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2013820,00.html>)

Proponents of doing just that insist there's more consensus than ever in the U.S. to ditch the Cuba embargo and its travel ban, which, after almost 50 years, have utterly failed to dislodge the Castro regime. Opening Cuba to Americans, they believe, will do more to stimulate democratization there than isolating it has. Even a majority of Cuban Americans now agree. Still, for all the good vibes the bill's backers feel from the White House right now, some note warily that Obama has been loath to spend political capital in Cuba, or the rest of Latin America for that matter. Critics, for example, point to his decision last year to stop applying pressure against coup leaders in Honduras, who'd ousted a leftist President, when conservative Republicans in Congress objected. Embargo supporters, including Cuban-American Senator Robert Menendez of New Jersey, a Democrat, are already blasting Obama's plans to relax Cuba travel. "This is not the time to ease the pressure on the Castro regime," Menendez said this month, insisting it will only give the brothers "a much needed infusion of dollars that will only extend their reign of oppression." As a result, says one congressional aide who asked not to be identified, when it comes time for the White House to give the bill more full-throated support, "there's a fear they may just decide that the fight's not worth it."

#### Economic Engagement initiatives in Latin America require Obama push and drain PC

Oppenheimer, 13

Andres, American editor and foreign affairs columnist @ Miami Herald. author of “Saving the Americas” and four other best-selling books, co-winner of the 1987 Pulitzer Prize as a member of The Miami Herald team that uncovered the Iran-Contra scandal. He won the Inter-American Press Association Award twice (1989 and 1994), and the 1997 award of the National Association of Hispanic Journalists, selected by the Forbes Media Guide as one of the “500 most important journalists” of the United States in 1993, and by Poder Magazine as one of the “100 most powerful people” in Latin America in 2002 and 2008, Miami Herald, 5/8,

<http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/05/08/3387818/andres-oppenheimer-obama-should.html>

I’ve read with great attention President Barack Obama’s article in The Miami Herald earlier this week on how to improve U.S. relations with Latin America. It was pretty disappointing. The article, headlined “Improving our Partnership” and published after Obama’s return from a trip to Mexico and Costa Rica, says that “this is a moment of great promise for our hemisphere” and is full of feel-good talk about the future of the Americas. But, sadly, it showed the absence of any U.S. plans to drastically expand trade ties with Latin America — like the Obama administration has done with Asia and Europe — or any sign that, in his second term, Obama will pay greater attention to this hemisphere. Before we get into what Obama should do, let’s take a quick look at the facts. In his article, Obama stated that about 40 percent of U.S. exports are currently going to Latin America, and that these exports are growing at a faster pace than U.S. shipments to the rest of the world. Also, Obama celebrated that the U.S. Congress is finally close to approving comprehensive immigration reform. While that’s a U.S. domestic issue, it would have a positive economic impact on Mexico and Central America, since millions of newly legalized immigrants would be able to visit their native countries, and would most likely be sending more money to their families back home. But here are some of the facts that Obama failed to mention in his article: • U.S. total trade with Latin America has actually fallen as a percentage of total U.S. trade over the past decade. While 39 percent of overall U.S. trade was with the Western Hemisphere in 2000, that percentage fell to 38 percent in 2012, according to U.S. Department of Commerce data. • Despite Obama’s May 23, 2008, campaign promise to launch “a new alliance of the Americas,” he has not started any major hemispheric free trade initiative. By comparison, every recent U.S. president had started — or at least tried to start — a hemisphere-wide trade deal. • Obama has launched the Trans-Pacific Partnership free trade talks with mostly Asian countries, and a similar Trans-Atlantic Partnership free trade negotiation with the 27-member European Union, but has not announced any plans for a Trans-American Partnership. Granted, he has helped ratify free trade deals with Colombia and Panama, which had been signed by his predecessor. And, sure, the Trans-Pacific Partnership plan includes a few Latin American countries, such as Mexico, Peru and Chile, but they are a minority within the proposed new bloc. • In his May 2 trip to Mexico, Obama failed to meet Mexico’s request to be included in the U.S.-proposed Trans-Atlantic partnership free trade talks with the European Union. The Mexican governments had asked that Mexico and Canada be included in the Trans-Atlantic Partnership plan, so that the proposed deal could become a North American-European Union deal. But the White House response was, not yet. • Despite Obama’s 2011 announcement of a plan to increase to 100,000 the number of Latin American students in U.S. colleges, and to 100,000 the number of U.S. students in Latin American universities — his most ambitious initiative for the region — progress on the project has been slow. The plan calls for significant private sector funding, but Obama has invested little time, or political capital, in it. Fund-raising has been left in charge of the State Department, whose boss — Secretary of State John Kerry — has shown scant interest in Latin America. Kerry did not travel with Obama to Mexico and Costa Rica last week, and his April 18 remark at a congressional hearing about Latin America being “our backyard” had the rare effect of antagonizing friends and foes alike in the region. My opinion: As regular readers of this column know well, I much prefer Obama over his Republican critics on most issues. But I find it unfortunate that, as Obama’s recent trade initiatives with Asia and Europe show, he looks East and West, but very little toward the South. Neither he, nor Kerry, nor any Cabinet-level official is focused on the region. Perhaps it’s too late to expect any changes. But the least Obama could do is get personally involved in the projects he has already launched. For instance, he should pick up the phone and ask CEO’s of top multinationals to chip in funds for his plan to raise student exchanges with Latin America to 100,000 in both directions. If Obama doesn’t get personally involved, not even that will happen.